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AMERICAN LABOR POLICY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY: CLARIFYING
POLICIES AND INTERESTS'
TERRY COLLINGSWORTH *
I. INTRODUCTION
American labor policy' was developed at a time when the Amer-
ican economy was largely self-contained and independent. 2 The
primary goal of labor legislation was to respond to the crisis affect-
ing the masses of workers who had little expectation beyond ob-
taining employment at bare subsistence wages. 3 These workers were
historically unable to improve their situation because employers
dealt harshly with any attempts to organize and act collectively.
The labor legislation initially enacted served the purpose of
protecting American workers by law while they organized and bar-
gained collectively.` Minimum wage and hour laws, along with safety
and health laws, set a floor for the level of working conditions.'
f Copyright 0 1990 Terry Collingsworth.
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles, B.A. 1979, Cleveland
State University; J.D. 1982, Duke University.
I would like to thank the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and Loyola Law School for
research grants that enabled me to travel to Southeast Asia to research labor laws and labor
conditions. Visiting the countries that are going through the painful transition to the indus-
trial age was an experience 1 will never forget. I dedicate this Article to the workers of the
world who are struggling to achieve a standard of living that is consistent with human dignity.
I would also like to thank Jennifer Kanamura, John Short, arid Leslie Stearns for their
excellent research assistance, and Richard Skolnick and Steve Gold for their helpful com-
ments.
' For purposes of this Article, "American labor policy" refers to legislation enacted to
govern the relationship between employers and employees. For a discussion of the more
important aspects of labor policy, see infra notes 22-82 and accompanying text.
2 The internationalization of the economy is a recent phenomenon stemming from gains
in communication, transportation, and various government programs designed to encourage
investment in developing countries. See infra note 8 for further discussion of the global
economy.
See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plight of American
workers prior to labor legislation.
See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of early labor legislation's
efforts at protecting workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively.
5 See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislation designed
to improve working conditions.
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Later, labor policy was further enhanced by various statutes de-
signed to protect certain human rights, primarily the right to em-
ployment free of discrimination'
As long as the American economy remained independent or
relatively unchallenged in world markets, American labor policy
was an effective step in the direction of assuring that workers were
treated with basic fairness. Further, American business was able to
remain competitive because domestic producers incurred basically
the same labor costs.' The world economy has become increasingly
interdependent, 8
 however, and multinational companies ("MNCs")''
are now able to transfer freely production from the United States
to developing countries to take advantage of significantly lower
labor costs made possible by the virtual absence of regulations pro-
tecting workers.'° This transfer of production is permitted, if not
encouraged, by policies of the United States government developed
with an express purpose of fueling business expansion, assisting
developing countries, and promoting exports of American prod-
ucts.
The development of an extensive international economy has
greatly reduced the effectiveness of current labor legislation and
raises basic questions about the direction of American policy. If
American MNCs can freely seek out cheaper labor in developing
countries and abandon high-priced American workers, then the
hard fought gains of the American labor movement were a Pyrrhic
6 See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
See, e.g., Columbus & Georgia Ry. Co. v. Adm'r. of Wage and Hour Div., l26 F.2d 136,
140 (5th Cir. 1942) (minimum wage and hour law sets uniform standards to equalize wages
and remove advantage from low wages).
" See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
1001(a)(1), 102 Stat. 1120 (1988) ("in the last 10 years there has arisen a new global
economy in which trade, technological development, investment, and services form an inte-
grated system; and in this system these activities affect each other and the health of the
United States economy"); jedel & Stamm, The Battle Over Jobs: An Appraisal of Recent Publi-
cations on the Employment Effects of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in AMERICAN LABOR AND
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 144, 150-51 (D. Kujawa ed. 1973).
9
 The term "multinational company ("MNC") is used in its commonly understood form
to denote a firm that is operating in more than one country, whether it is producing in more
than one country or gathering components from various locations to assemble. One major
work on the analysis of the global power of MNCs has objected to the term because it implies
worldwide participation, when in fact nationals from the MNC's home country almost always
control the management and own the stock of the company. See R. BARNNET & R. MOLLER,
GLOBAL REACH, THE POWER OF TILE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 17-18 (1974).
m For a discussion of examples of working conditions in developing countries, see infra
notes 164-224 and accompanying text.
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victory. If those gains meant something rooted in principle, and
represented deliberate movement in the evolution of worker rights
and industrial democracy," then the circumvention of those rights
reflects a major weakness in current policy. This is particularly true
when the foreign workers are exploited due to the virtual absence
of effective labor regulation in developing countries. 12
An issue related to American MNCs' eagerness to shift their
production to developing countries is why American policy so freely
allows this practice without regard for the impact on American
interests. A fundamental assumption of all policies that promote
business is that if business does well, then the rest of the country
will benefit. Perhaps the most memorable expression of this policy
is the famous statement by Charles Wilson, a former president of
General Motors, that "what was good for our country was good for
General Motors and vice versa."" The assumption is that a growing
business, acting consistently with American interests, will hire ad-
ditional workers, pay them well, and allow the workers to increase
consumption and keep business growing — the classic justification
for the "trickle clown theory," recently revived as "supply side"
economics. t 4
While the overall merit of a trickle down development policy
can certainly be debated,'' its primary claim to legitimacy is that
government policies should promote business expansion so that
those dependent on business may also benefit. Not even the boldest
conservative policy maker would openly declare that government
should give special benefits to business regardless of whether there
are any resulting gains to the masses of workers that constitute the
vast majority of Americans. The trickle down system works as well
as it can when government trade and tariff policies encourage busi-
ness expansion internationally. It then assists American business in
expanding to foreign markets and increasing domestic employment
" Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the National Labor Relations Act, stated that he
viewed his labor legislation as a step in the evolution of worker rights. See infra text accom-
panying note 53 for the direct quotation from Senator Wagner.
" See infra notes'231-325 and accompanying text for a discussion of the absence of
effective labor regulation in developing countries.
15 The statement is widely quoted. E.g., Reich, Corporation and Nation, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, May 1988, at 76. Prior to this, under President Hoover, "the business of govern-
ment was business." B, BLUESTONE' 84 B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA
199 (1982).
a See id. at 197.
E5 See id. at 196-204.
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to meet the new demand. This is consistent with the goals of labor
policy.
The justification for the system breaks down, however, when
MNCs eliminate American workers from the equation by manufac-
turing products with cheap labor from developing countries and
then export those products to the United States. Americans lose
jobs,' 6 plant closings devastate communities,' 7 and such moves fur-
ther undermine American interests by contributing substantially to
the trade deficit. 18
 Further, American technology, often subsidized
by the gOvernment, is exported to other countries. 19 This also un-
dermines American defense interests." These developments cer-
tainly are inconsistent with any broad vision of "American interests."
Any basic economic analysis recognizes that the primary goal
of capitalistic enterprises, to increase profits, makes such moves
inevitable. Marxist theory accurately predicted that producers will
avail themselves of cheaper labor whenever possible.2 ' This devel-
opment is inevitable, however, only as long as business remains
unregulated.If the expansion of American business into developing
countries actually hurts American labor, then allowing this type of
expansion to continue without regulation can no longer be justified
on the basis that it improves employment at home.
The internationalization of the economy raises many important
labor-related issues. It would be impossible to do complete justice
to them all in a single article. The more modest goal of this article
is to demonstrate a relationship between trade policy and labor
policy, and to raise very fundamental questions as to whether it
16 See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of American job loss
resulting from the exploitation of cheap labor in developing countries.
17 See, e.g., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 63-78 (discussing a variety
of ripple effects of plant closings, including the mental health of the unemployed, the impact
on the local economy, and the need for increased public spending).
16 See, e.g., Jedel & Stamm, supra note 8, at 151.
'9 Goldfinger, An American Trade Union View of Trade and Investment, in AMERICAN LABOR
AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 40-41 (D. Kujawa ed. 1973); Oversight of U.S. Trade
Policy: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance
and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1981); Reich, Put a Brake on High-Tech
Alliances, L.A. Times, Mar. 20,1989, at 5.
20 P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT POWERS 685-86 (1987).
2k See, e.g., MARX, WAGE-LABOUR AND CAPITAL 39 (1933) (profits can only grow rapidly
when the price of labor — the relative wages — decreases just as rapidly). Even a more
conservative observer, Oliver Wendell Holmes, recognized that "one of the eternal conflicts
out of which life is made up . is that society, disguised under the name of capital, [attempts
to get man's] services for the least possible return." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92,108,
44 N.E. 1077,1081 (1896).
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furthers broader American interests to promote trade and business
expansion at the expense of labor policy. The article will hopefully
begin a dialogue that will focus on the issues and facilitate resolution
of the problem.
The first section demonstrates that the principles underlying
American labor policy are being seriously undermined due to the
internationalization of the economy. Specific components of labor
legislation are discussed to illustrate that the conflict between labor
and management as interest groups has already been resolved by
the adoption of a policy that attempts, to strike a balance between
the competing interests. That policy is no longer negotiable, as it
requires that certain protections be given to workers in exchange
for providing companies with the opportunity to have a stable en-
vironment in the most lucrative market in the world.
The article then discusses how this balance is undermined when
American companies displace American workers by transferring
production to developing countries for the purpose of exporting
goods back to the United States. Two primary dimensions to labor
policy are impacted. First, these relocations cause American workers
to lose their jobs because of their protected status. Second, to allow
American companies to exploit workers in developing countries by
utilizing labor practices that would be considered illegal under
American law and inhumane in any civilized society conflicts with
the underlying values of American labor policy. If MNCs can return
to the days of exploited labor and still have access to the American
market, this violates the balance struck to enact American labor
legislation long ago.
The article then discusses trade and tariff policies that allow, if.
not encourage, American MNCs to transfer their operations to
developing countries. Trade and tariff laws that allow American
business to succeed at the expense of American workers (or regard-
less of American workers) fundamentally conflicts with labor policy.
Finally, the article analyzes congressional efforts to protect the
values of labor policy by regulating the exploitation of workers in
developing countries. Several recent statutes attempt to impose min-
imum standards for worker rights in developing countries in ex-
change for trade benefits. These statutes alone are not sufficient to
prevent the erosion of labor policy because of the lack of any
restrictions on displacement of American workers when MNCs re-
locate abroad. The Article concludes with an explanation of the
current void in policy based on outdated assumptions that MNCs
will act consistently with American interests and a proposal to pro-
36	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:31
tect more effectively American workers and preserve the goals of
labor policy in an international economy.
II. AMERICAN LABOR POLICY
A. Specific Components of American Labor Policy
In order to assess accurately the extent to which American labor
policy is endangered by the recent trend to transfer production to
developing countries, the specific components of labor policy must
first be discussed. Americans have very short historical memories.
The current enthusiasm to deregulate the economy and allow the
"free market" to contro1 22 ignores the fact that working conditions
were regulated in the first place to curb the deplorable conditions
that resulted from business unrestrained.
In order to emphasize the importance of continued observance
of the values underlying labor policy, this section will discuss the
major steps of its development. This approach allows parallels to
be drawn`between American labor history and the current labor
situation in developing countries. 23 This is not meant to be an
exhaustive history of the development of labor legislation in the
United States. 24
1. Working Conditions Prior to Labor Legislation
The deplorable working conditions and the brutal resistance to
worker organization that existed prior to modern labor regulation
are well documented. Landmark works of fiction describe the details
of the life of workers during the early stages of the labor move-
ment,25 but the historical record paints an equally bleak picture.
Up until the late 1930s, a laborer was doomed to a life of hand
to mouth subsistence. In 1929, at least half of the working families
lived at or below the subsistence level. 26 The prosperity of the
industrial revolution eluded the workers, and it was clear that, for
22 This was certainly one of the cornerstones of "Reaganomics." For a specific expression
of Reagan's free market philosophy, see infra notes 367-71 and accompanying text. For a
populist expression of this philosophy, see G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981).
23 See infra notes 146-230 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exploitation of
workers in developing countries.
24 For more extensive historical treatment, see, e.g., S. PERLMAN & P. TAsr, HISTORY OF
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1935); R. ZIEGLER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS,
1920-1985 (1986).
25 See, e.g., U. SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1922); J. STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939).
26 E.g., R. ZIEGLER, supra note 24, at 7-8.
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the most part, the business community was not voluntarily going to
share its gains. 27 The growth of large corporations in this period
exacerbated the problem. The personal relationship between work-
ers and employers disappeared, and the individual worker had
virtually no bargaining power. 28 The fact that many of the industrial
jobs were unskilled reduced workers to fungible parts of the indus-
trial machine.
Other factors contributed to the poor conditions under which
workers were forced to accept employment, but the primary prob-
lem was the lack of bargaining power. 2° The only apparent solution
was some form of collective action, like unionization, but this idea
met with fierce resistance from employers. The only weapon the
workers had was the strike. When they exercised this right, the
strikes were often brutally suppressed by management, utilizing
private security forces" or public officers. 3 ' Further, the courts
assisted in denying the right to strike by holding that these collective
actions were criminal conspiracies" or that they were illegal con-
spiracies in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws."
Workers made few gains during the period when government
and management combined to prevent unionization. During this
period, labor was viewed as an exploitable commodity that was
necessary for industrial development. Employers viewed any exer-
tion of control by the workers as a usurpation of the fundamental
liberty right to employ non-union workers under any conditions
they accepted. 34
2. Federal Intervention on Behalf of Workers — The Passage of
National Labor Legislation
Beginning with the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 35 the policy
of the federal government began to shift. Its initial view was that
22 Not all businesses were cruelly exploiting workers during this time, so any reference
to a generalized "business community" is not meant to convey universal application.
29 A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 5 ( 10th ed. 1986).
29 See id,
" E.g., R. ZIEGLER, supra note 24, at 66 (Ford Motor Company had a paramilitary force
of 3000 men during the 1930's).
51 E.g., id. at 24, 56.
S2 E.g., R. GORMAN, BASIC. TEXT ON LABOR LAW 1 (1976).
S5 Id.
" See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229,250-51 (1917).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). Although there were earlier examples of labor legislation,
such as the Railway Labor Act of 1926,45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982), this was the first broadly
applicable legislation. It marked the start of a federal role in regulating labor relations. --
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government must act to uphold the "free market" system and not
interfere with employment relationships, 36
 which in effect meant
that the government actively suppressed labor. It later changed to
acceptance of the view that the business community was not likely
to improve working conditions gratuitously, and that it was in the
national interest to legislate for the protection of workers. The
Norris-LaGuardia Act was the first of a series of statutes designed
to curb the worst aspects of government participation in the
suppression of labor. The basic thrust of this legislation was to
remove the power of federal courts to issue injunctions to stop labor
disputes," except under very limited circumstances."
There are at least three major reasons for this initial shift in
the government's labor policy, and they are important for under-
standing the continuing validity of the social compact struck by labor
legislation. First, once the basic infrastructure for the industrial
revolution was in place, public opinion began to question the need
to have such a blatantly lopsided system for distributing the gains.
The public had questioned the basic fairness and reality of the
trickle down theory in the context of government policies to reduce
tax burdens on business. The government argued that this would
stimulate the economy and help the struggling workers. One rather
colorful expression of contempt for this approach to economic reg-
ulation comes from this period:
The theory of those in power seems to be that if
Congress will only help the railroads, the Wall Street bank-
ers, the big manufacturing monopolies, and the im-
mensely rich, enough will ooze through for the laboring
man . . . . The contention of the powers that be is that
the way to feed a starving dumb brute is to give some
thoughtless, selfish man all he desires to eat and perhaps
he will have enough bones for the poor dog to gnaw .. . 39
36
 See, e.g., Hitchman Coal, 245 U.S. at 239-40.
31 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982).
33 Id. § 107.
39 65 CONG. REC. 2570 (1924) (statement of Rep. Lankford). A more contemporary
statement from Rep. Don Pease (D-Ohio) is "[t]he rationale for free trade is that a rising tide
lifts all boats ... [If America is to embrace free trade] we have every right to insist that the
workers who make [the] products benefit from that process, and that it is not just multina-
tional corporations and government officials who benefit from plants manufacturing over-
seas." International Workers' Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Interna-
tional Organizations of the Howe Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings on Worker Rights].
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The public became increasingly sympathetic to the plight of working
people whose economic fate depended entirely on the unilateral
generosity of the business community.
Along this same line, as a response to the extreme economic
polarity existing during the decades preceding the early labor leg-
islation, radical groups began to gain influence, and sought fun-
damental changes in the economic structure of the country. 4° In
1934, in particular, systematic strikes threatened the stability of the
economy.'" People were ready to see the government begin to sup-
port interests broader than those of the business community. The
increase in radicalism influenced the agenda of issues and encour-
aged Congress to strike a preemptive blow. Although it is impossible
to say what might have happened, it is clear that the radical move-
ment did lose much of its momentum when the government finally
responded with legislation to protect workers.
Finally, it was the opinion of many members of the Roosevelt
administration and Congress that the key to economic recovery
from the Great Depression was to increase the purchasing power
of America's workers42 and to assist the business climate by reducing
labor disputes." Indeed, some evidence indicates that recovery, not
reform, was the primary motivation of the Roosevelt administra-
tion. 44 It viewed a strong domestic economy as essential to long term
economic health.
The first major legislation to attempt to protect the specific
rights of workers generally to organize, and to regulate systemati-
cally wages and hours, was section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933. 45 The Supreme Court ultimately held this
legislation to be unconstitutiona1, 46 and it was also considered to be
inadequate due to its ineffective enforcement mechanisms. 47
" See, e.g., R. Zir:GLER, supra note 24, at 17-21; 4 S. PERLMAN & T. TAE-r, supra note 24,
at 386-402 (1935).
4 ' 1. BERNSTEIN, TILE TURBULENT YEARS 217 (1970).
42 See, e,g., ZIEGLER, supra note 24, at 38. Section 1 of the National Labor Relations At
of 1935 expressly provides that certain efforts to prevent collective action by workers "tend[]
to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing
power of wage earners .. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
45 See B. BLUESTONE & 13, HARRISON, supra note 13, at 202.
44 I. BERNSTEIN, TILE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 26, 131 (1950).
45 To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings On § 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Education
and Labor, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 16 (1934) (statement of Senator Wagner), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 at 46 [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
46 Schechter Poultry Corp. v, United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
45 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note-45, at 15, 114-36. The primary problem Was that
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To remedy the specific problems with the NIRA, Senator Wag-
ner proposed the Wagner Act of 1935, the first manifestation of
the National Labor Relations Act. 48 Its main thrust was to protect
the rights to organize and bargain collectively.4° The hearings prior
to passage of the Wagner Act reflect a genuine awareness of the
need to check the power of large corporations and to empower
workers so that they could bargain equally with management and
improve the abhorrent conditions under which they worked. 5° Con-
gress recognized that without government intervention to protect
workers, management would continue to set wages and conditions
at the lowest level possible.
Passage of the NLRA meant a firm rejection of the concept
that the free market should exclusively control wages and working
conditions. The underlying values were both humanitarian and
economic. That is, the Act's primary purpose was to stop the ex-
ploitation of workers, but it was also believed that the domestic
economy would improve by increased consumer spending. 5 ' Once
the Supreme Court affirmed the NLRA,52 the vindicated policy
represented a clear shift in the basic philosophy of the federal
government as it relates to the protection of workers. As Senator
Wagner expressed the goal he was aiming for:
The only way that the worker will be accorded the
freedom of contract to which, under our theory of gov-
ernment, he is entitled, is by the intrusion of the govern-
ment to give him that right, by protecting collective bar-
gaining. When 10,000 come together and collectively
bargain with the employer, then there is equality of bar-
gaining power. That is all this legislation attempts to pre-
serve, and I think it is a matter of evolution."
Although there is no elaboration on this theme in the hearings,
it seems that by introducing the concept of evolution, Senator Wag-
ner was expressing his view of the inevitable development in an
industrial society towards equality and away from exploitation.
the courts had construed section 7(a)(2) to permit the formation of company dominated
unions, which became the chief impediment to any independent union environment. Id,
4" 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982) ("NLRA").
49 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265 (1964).
5° See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, at 37, 47, 515-16.
91 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the idea that an
increase in purchasing power will lead to economic recovery.
92 NLRB v. Jones.& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,49 (1937).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, at 47 (emphasis added).
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These values form a cornerstone of American labor policy. Senator
Wagner recognized that this evolution was unlikely to occur without
positive government intervention, and that government policies
should not be directed exclusively to assisting the business com-
munity.54
This spirit of intervention in the market to protect workers
carried over to the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938. 55 Basically, the FLSA sets minimum wages 56 and maximum
hours57 for all covered employees58 working for an employer 59 in a
covered enterprise. 88 The humanitarian purpose of the FLSA was
expressly stated in the legislation: "The Congress finds that the
existence . . . of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers . burdens commerce and . . .
constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce . . . . "61
Emphasizing the humanitarian purpose, the Supreme Court
stated of the FLSA's provisions protecting workers, "[w]e are not
here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with the
rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of
their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others."' The
Supreme Court also recognized that the FLSA bans from interstate
commerce products produced "under conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for
health and general well-being."63 Thus, the purpose of the FLSA is
clear — it is the policy of the United States to prohibit employers
from sinking below established minimums in setting working con-
ditions. The Act resolves the issue of whether it is legitimate for
" The NLRA imposes on the government a statutory obligation to intervene and protect
workers, which reverses the past practice of intervening to protect business from workers'
attempts to organize, See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
government's assistance in suppressing early labor strikes.
55 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1978) ("FLSA").
56 Id. § 206(a).
57 Id. § 207(a).
58 	§ 203(e).
59 lrl. § 202(d),
", Id. § 203(r).
6 t Id. § 202(a).
'32 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,321 U.S. 590,597 (1944).
"5 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,109 (1941). See also 81 CONG. REc. 4983 (1937)
(statement of President Roosevelt endorsing the FLSA and its promise to give employees "Eal
fair day's pay for a fair day's work" and its commitment to protect employees from "the evil
of 'overwork' as well as 'underpay'").
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employers to try to increase profits and remain competitive at the
expense of humane treatment of workers.
Other than amendments to the NLRA 64 and the FLSA,65 labor
policy remained fairly fixed for several decades and involved im-
plementation of the goals of both acts. Gains were made in worker
safety and health by the passage of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act,66 another example of legislation designed to use the
power of government to force employers to comply with specific
minimums to improve general working conditions.
One other significant development in labor policy that was
implemented only after the basic economic issues were institution-
alized was the introduction of prohibitions against discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 67 which prohibits discrim-
ination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, 68 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 69 which pro-
hibits discrimination based on age, 7° added an additional human
rights element to labor policy. The opportunities for employment
and the benefits flowing from employment could no longer be
legally denied to persons based on arbitrary discriminations against
those in the protected categories.
Passage of legislation prohibiting discrimination was again a
strong statement of policy by Congress that the business community
must be regulated in order to achieve something besides bottom
line concerns. The principles of equality simply could not be left to
the good faith of the business community and to society at large. 7 '
" E.g., The Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 and The Landrum-Griffin Amendments
of 1959.29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). Congress designed many of the specific provisions of
the amendments to curb abuses by some unions that had grown too powerful, and to confront
charges of corruption by union leaders.
65 E.g., Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 and Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1955.29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1978).
66
 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). 	 •
67
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
68 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
69 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
Id. § 623(a)( 1).
71 That equal employment opportunities must be enforced by legislation and cannot be
left to reliance on the good faith of the business community is illustrated by the employment
practices of some American-based companies operating in Asia and violating the principles
of equal employment opportunity as soon as they are no longer technically bound by law to
follow them. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion
of this point.
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B. The Implicit Balancing of Interests Underlying Labor Policy
Although the labor movement began as a bitter struggle be-
tween the opposing interest groups — workers and management
— Congress finally intervened and implemented a policy that re-
solved many of the issues in dispute. The range of debatable issues
between workers and management was substantially narrowed. Spe-
cific labor legislation expressly resolved whether workers have a
right to organize and bargain collectively, 72 whether employees may
be discharged for union organizing activities," whether manage-
ment may exploit workers by paying them as little as the market
will allow and working them as long as they can function, 74
 and
whether employers may exploit some groups of workers more than
others because of societal discrimination. 75 These rights are now the
firm base of labor policy. When employers attempt to circumvent
these specific prohibitions, they are no longer simply engaging in
the age old antagonism against labor, but also are acting against
express legislation that forms American labor policy.
The resolution of the initial conflict was not entirely one-sided.
Congress did recognize that in order for workers to have the op-
portunity to improve their lives, employers had to be able to remain
in business. The quid pro quo for employers was that labor legislation
would reduce labor disputes, 7" remove any unfair competitive ad-
vantage gained by excessive exploitation by ensuring uniform min-
imum standards," and strengthen the domestic economy by im-
proving the purchasing poWer of workers," There was a tacit
understanding that if labor cooperated, it would share some of the
gains from the worldwide demand for American products. 79
Senator Wagner's goal was to achieve these positive effects for
business and to improve the conditions for workers:
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
73
 See id. § 158(a)(3).
74 See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government's
attempts at protecting workers.
m See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of worker protection
against employment discrimination.
75 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (statement of purpose in the National Labor Relations
Act that the legislation would reduce labor disputes and improve the stability of the economy).
" See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of
uniform standards for labor.
75 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, at 2284.
79 See, e.g., Nissen, U.S. Workers and the U.S. Labor Movement, 33 MONTHLY REV. 25 (May
1981).
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The upswing of business cannot be maintained in-
definitely unless there is a tremendous reduction in un-
employment, a sustained rise in purchasing power, and a
removal of the present industrial discontent based so largely upon
a denial of legal as well as ethical rights . . . .
The passage of the [NTLRA] will help ... every in-
dustry that believes that contented and decently treated
workers are the richest materials any country can possess
And in helping industry let us not forget that we shall help
the worker also. Forty thousand American workers have
borne the depression with heroic patience and fortitude.
Those who did not actually lose their jobs were tormented,
nevertheless, by the constant fear of insecurity and by the
added burden of helpless relative's and friends. Even those
at work have seen their children denied the elementary
needs of food, clothing, and schooling. They have gone
through the valley of despair for the future of their fam-
ilies. In trials of peace as in trials of war, the American
workers have never broken faith with this country or its
Government. They have been the backbone and the
strength of the Nation. The time has come when our
Government must recognize the deep extent of their de-
votion. We must not now repudiate the pledge that has
been given them of emancipation from economic slavery
and of an opportunity to walk the streets free men in fact
as well as in name."
Thus, employers were forced to comply with labor legislation
in exchange for the privilege of access to American workers and to
the most lucrative market in the world. As a result of this exchange,
radical groups demanding collective ownership of business lost
much of their momentum once the major components of labor
legislation were passed.'" This dynamic preserved the capitalistic
system of ownership at a time when it was endangered, and it also
explains the motivation for the support given to labor legislation by
capitalists." Further, this compact fused the interests of business
and labor. If labor could count on a share of the bounty, then it
was in labor's interest to see business prosper. This interdependence
provided the justification for policies to provide government ben-
efits that encouraged business expansion.
8" LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Supra note 45, at 2284 (emphasis added).
"I See supra note 40 and accompanying text for further discussion of these radical groups.
62 J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 42-43 (1983).
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The fact that American businesses experienced unprecedented
prosperity fueled by consumer spending and international expan-
sion indicates that it was not an unfair exchange for business. When
formulating new policies to deal with problems of the international
economy, lawmakers must remember the assumptions of this ex-
change.
III. THE IMPACT ON AMERICAN LABOR POLICY OF SHIFTING
PRODUCTION TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The purpose of this section is to specifically identify how Amer-
ican labor policy is impacted when American MNCs transfer pro-
duction to developing countries.83 If the impact is significant, then
the conflict between current business practices and well established
labor policy must be addressed. Also, one might question whether
trade policies which, as the next section demonstrates,84 encourage
these moves, are justified.
The impact on labor policy has two dimensions. First, while no
clear prohibitions on a company's freedom to relocate to a devel-
oping country exist," such moves, if done to escape the costs of
American labor laws, cause job loss through a new manifestation of
"runaway shops."8" This phenomenon is much more serious than
the more traditional intra-American runaway shop. 87 The principles
that form the basis of the labor laws are meaningless if companies
are free to relocate to developing countries that provide no protec-
tions for workers, and if the companies are leaving because labor
protections have made American labor more costly than in these
developing countries. Further, the fact that a company has the
83 See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extent of this
movement.
84 See infra notes 231-325 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of these
trade policies.
85 Sec infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text for a discussion or the attempts of
American businesses to relocate.
86 The term "runaway shop" developed to describe a company's closing of a unionized
facility, or its closing of a facility in response to the threat of unionization, accompanied by
the movement of operations to another part of the country where it was less likely that a
union could successfully organize. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington M lg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263,272-73 (1965). The modern runaway shop can take many forms besides that
of a simple exchange where one facility is closed and a replacement is opened. See infra note
407 for a discussion of the impact of runaway shops.
87 The primary distinction is that the old runaway shop neither caused jobs to leave the
United States nor impacted the overall employment picture.
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potential to flee to a developing country results in a tremendous
chilling effect on the rights that American workers may assert. 88
Second, and equally important, while American labor laws tech-
nically are not violated when an American company operating in
the third world employs workers under conditions that would be
illegal in the United States, the company commits a moral violation
that conflicts with the humanitarian objectives of American labor
policy." The laws prohibiting suppression of unions, inhumane
working conditions, employment at less than subsistence wages, and
discrimination should not be simply burdensome requirements that
can be ignored as soon as the law is technically inapplicable.
A. Impact on Labor Policy of Loss of Jobs Due to Shifting of Production
to Developing Countries
1. The Runaway Shop in an International Economy
American labor policy has allowed American workers to enjoy
the highest standard of living in the world, and also has made them
among the most costly. 9° These costs generally have not hindered
the success of American business, particularly because until recently,
most had no choice but to pay American wages. Further, the high
American wages have supported the most lucrative domestic market
in the world, which certainly has been a major factor in the success
of American business. 9 '
One early tactic to attempt to avoid high labor costs associated
with unionized workers was to close a union facility and reopen a
nonunion facility, normally in some other part of the country. 92
Recognizing that this practice would have a chilling effect on the
rights of workers to unionize, the United States Supreme Court, in
the 1965 case of Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,93 suggested
" See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the chilling effect
that such threats may have on workers.
99 See text accompanying notes 146-230, infra, for a discussion of the moral issues
involved in exploiting workers in developing countries.
90
 The standard of living enjoyed by American workers is difficult to quantify due to
factors besides wages that contribute to that standard of living. Suffice it to say that, on all
dimensions, American workers are among the highest paid in the world.
91 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic impact
of improving working conditions and raising wages.
92 See, e.g., Local 1330 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1282 (6th Cir. 1980) ("The
problem of plant closing and plant removal from one section of the country to another is by
no means new in American history.").
" 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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that such "runaway shops" were a violation of the NLRA. 94 The
court reasoned that an employer could always go out of business,
even for anti-union reasons, so the workers who lost their jobs had
no recourse under the NLRA. 95 If the employer opened a new
facility or had other facilities, however, these employees' rights to
organize and collectively bargain would be chilled by the knowledge
that the employer had in the past retaliated against union organiz-
ers."
The Darlington court solved the problem of runaway shops
relocating to non-unionized areas of the country. The international
economy, however, has presented a new opportunity to revive the
runaway shop. If an American employer wants to flee a unionized
plant, he can close his plant and relocate to Mexico or Taiwan, for
example. Whether this form of the runaway shop would violate the
NLRA after Darlington is unclear. 97 The problem is greatly magni-
fied by the new runaway shop, however, because it makes this tactic
attractive to others besides those fleeing unions. Employers who
simply want to escape high wages, whether or not they are union
wages, costly health and safety regulations, or discrimination laws,
can relocate to countries where such laws do not exist. Assuming
that these employers have easy access to export products back to
the United States," American MNCs can have the best of both
worlds. They can pay third world wages and charge first world
prices by exporting goods from developing countries to the United
States.99 The problem is magnified further because the United
94 See id. at 272-73.
Id. at 271-72.
" See id. at 275-76.
97 A simple case would involve a single facility employer who closes his plant in the
United States and reopens in Taiwan. According to Darlington, the American employees have
no further rights once the facility is closed and the employer-employee relationship is ter-
minated. See id, at 271-72. If the employer reopened a nonunion shop in another state,
there would be an 8(a)(3) violation if the employer had an intent to chill the rights of the
new employees. See id. at 275-76. The Taiwanese workers, however, would have no rights
to chill because the NLRA would not cover foreign employees in a foreign country. Cf:
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
Darlington might cover other situations. For example, an employer with several facilities
in the United States could chill the rights of his remaining American employees by closing
just one facility and relocating to Taiwan. See, e.g., Great Chinese American Sewing Co. v.
NLRB, 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978).
g' Many American trade policies designed to complement world-wide "free markets"
assure this access to the United States. See text accompanying notes 231-325, infra, for a
more complete discussion.
" There is evidence indicating that cost savings realized by employing cheap labor are
not passed on to consumers. See infra note 259 and accompanying text for a similar point
about this relationship.
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States government is losing resources from the fleeing tax base, and
has no control over the labor practices of the fleeing companies."
This new version of the runaway shop obviously undermines
American labor policy if jobs are being lost because of a desire to
avoid costly American labor laws. As Congressman Burke stated in
1971 to support legislation designed to curb plant closings, "[t]he
old-fashioned runaway shop has become a global runaway, but the
U.S. law is not designed to meet this new development." 1 °' Ameri-
can labor laws can no longer be said to protect or benefit workers
if employers are leaving the country to avoid compliance, and
American workers are forced to compete with third world workers
to keep their jobs. Just as Darlington recognized that labor rights
were endangered if a company could avoid compliance by relocat-
ing, the protected rights to organize and bargain collectively are
meaningless if companies can relocate to countries where there are
no labor rights, and the foreign governments lure investment by
giving assurances that there will be no labor troubles."
The absence of any laws to prevent employers from fleeing
costly American labor regulations illustrates a serious void in labor
policy and a failure to adjust effectively to the internationalization
of the economy. A recently passed worker notification bill" does
little to prevent runaway shops, but instead simply requires sixty
days notice to be given with no limitation on the reasons for a
closure.' 04 An earlier law addressed precisely to the problem of
identifying plant closures occurring because of relocations" was
never implemented or enforced."
2. Extent of Job Loss Due to Runaway Shops
To assess accurately the need for policy reforms, lawmakers
must determine the extent of job loss due to runaway shops to
im 117 CONG. REc. 33,746 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Burke in support of H.R. 10914,
The Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972).
101 Id.
In There is clear evidence that the governments of developing countries are responding
to demands from MNCs that they be given a union free environment in exchange for
investing. See infra notes 17-77 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of this
point.
103 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat.
890 (1988).
104 Id. § 3 .
105 19 U.S.C. § 2394 (1975).
106 Letter from Denise M. Robichaud, Industrial Relations Specialist, Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs, to Terry Col-
lingsworth (Sept. 21, 1987) (stating that 19 U.S.C. § 2394 was never implemented).
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developing countries. This very real effect due to a lack of regula-
tion in the area provides the primary basis for questioning the
assumption that American MNCg continue to act with overall Amer-
ican interests in mind. The precise job loss attributable to the trans-
fer of production is difficult to assess, as a firm might invest in a
foreign facility for varied reasons. In addition, not all of these
reasons conflict with labor policy and result in a loss of domestic
employment. Attempts to identify job loss from foreign investment
have been largely ineffective due to a failure to distinguish between
types of foreign investment.
The three reasons most often given for foreign investment are
to obtain access to raw materials, to protect or develop local markets,
and to lower costs of production, primarily through decreased labor
costs.m7 The first two of these reasons, as well as some specific
problems raised by protective laws that prevent export to a foreign
country and require a local facility to penetrate the market, 10" pro-
vide legitimate reasons for foreign investment that do not necessar-
ily undermine labor policy.
In every case, many variables impact the effect on employ-
ment,'" but the purpose for the foreign investment is crucial to the
analysis. For example, if an American company wants to enter the
Korean car market and decides to build the cars in Korea to do so,
this choice clearly costs American jobs to the extent that the cars
could have been made in the United States and exported to Korea.
If the cars sell very well in Korea, however, because they are made
there and can compete cost-wise with local firms, then the job loss
can not be calculated based on the number of workers needed to
build the cars actually sold. Further, if the cars sell well in Korea,
then American jobs may be created to provide components, tech-
nical support and other necessary supporting services. This need
offsets to a limited extent the jobs lost to manufacturing. The ulti-
mate effect on employment depends upon a number of other var-
iables, including whether the supporting services are eventually
transferred to Korea."°
107 E.g., INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES IN DEVELOPING Cout.mtws 2 (2d ed. 1985). See also, Ray, Foreign Direct Investment in
Manufacturing, 85 J. POLIT. ECON. 283 (1977). For a more historical discussion, see BERGSTEN,
HORST & MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS 46-50 (1978).
1 " See BERGSTEN, HORST & MORAN supra note 107, at 46-47.
I" See id. at 4, 97; Finley, Foreign Trade and U.S. Employment, in U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT ON EMPLOYMENT 33 (1978).
110 See BERGSTEN, HORST & MORAN, Supra DOW 107, at 96.
50	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [V01.31:31
A much clearer loss of American employment occurs, however,
when an American car company chooses to transfer production to
Korea for the purpose of making the car less expensively, and
exporting it back to the United States. A refined statistical analysis
is not needed to reach this conclusion,"' and the evidence is mount-
ing that this type of foreign investment is increasing. 112
The competing claims as to the effects of foreign investment
can naturally be divided between organized labor, which claims that
foreign investment exports jobs, and MNCs, which claim that for-
eign investment increases domestic employment." 3 This polariza-
tion based on opposing interests certainly casts doubt on both gen-
eralizations. Because of the many variables present, there are
fundamental flaws in all studies that attempt to generalize. An
objective analysis of the situation must conclude that neither gen-
eralization can be supported. While certain types of foreign invest-
ment do export jobs, as organized labor contends and MNCs
deny, 14 some foreign investment aimed at capturing a local market
results in an increase in domestic employment because of increased
exports of equipment, components and support services." 5
A serious flaw in the research supporting the claim that foreign
investment always increases employment is that the figures are ag-
gregated, 1 t 6 and this method measures only the net effect and ob-
viously includes an offset for employment lost. Further, initial ex-
ports to support the foreign facility enhance the employment
gained, but the initial supporting exports are likely to be temporary
and thus will not really offset jobs permanently lost. 17 The accuracy
of any study in this area is further brought into question by varying
,1, R. BARNNET & R. MOLLER, supra DOW 9, at 96.
12 GAO, PLANT CLOSINGS—LIMITED ADVANCE NOTICE AND ASSISTANCE PROVIDED DIS-
LOCATED WORKERS '2 (1987). General Motors is currently marketing its Pontiac Lemans in
the United States and advertising that the car is made in Seoul, Korea. See infra note 119
and accompanying text for a similar point about American MNCs producing goods in foreign
countries.
" 3 See BERGSTEN, HORST & MORAN, supra note 107, at 97. See also, Stobaugh, U.S.
Multinational Enterprises and the U.S. Econirmy, m AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION 84-85 (D. Kujawa ed. 1973).
"4 The most important example of this occurrence is foreign investment to replace
domestic employment. For a discussion of the employment effects of this type of foreign
investment, see text accompanying notes 107-37, infra.
"5 See Stobaugh, supra note 113, at 106.
lib See id.
' 17 See BERGSTEN, HORST & MORAN, supra note 107, at 97. See infra notes 299-302 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the distorted nature of these figures.
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hypotheses of the effect on domestic employment of a total absence
of foreign investment." 8
The solution to the problem from a labor policy perspective,is
not to conclude that a definitive study is impossible, but to focus on
the type of foreign investment that conflicts with the goals of labor
policy. While some foreign investment to compete in a local market
may well have an ultimate negative impact on domestic employ-
ment, that type of foreign investment is very different from foreign
investment to displace American workers because of a desire to
avoid the application of American labor policy. The distinguishing
feature is whether the goods produced by the foreign investment
are exported to the United States. The internationalization of the
economy has drastically increased this type of foreign investment.
Imports are increasingly of products from American MNCs that
used to produce the goods here." 9 This wholesale removal of seg-
ments of the manufacturing sector corresponds with a massive loss
of manufacturing jobs. 120
When domestic production is replaced by foreign production
for the U.S. market,'" no one can seriously debate that employers
made this move to avoid the costs associated with labor policy. This
is the modern runaway shop that threatens the gains represented
by labor policy,' 22 as well as other American interests.'"
Measuring the impact of this type of foreign investment is still
very difficult because, as discussed earlier, none of the studies fo-
cuses on just this aspect. Instead, the studies try to measure the
overall effect of foreign investment. The problem is compounded
118 See BERGS-TEN, HORST Sc MORAN, supra note 107, at 96.
18 Trade Adjustment Assistance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1972) (remarks by Andrew .
J. Biemiller, Director of Legislation, AFL-CIO).
120 Id.
" 1 This transfer of production may take many forms. See infra note 407 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of runaway shops, one example of this transfer.
142 Certainly it is true that if domestic production could have serviced the foreign market,
but the company chose to produce in the foreign country to avoid American labor costs, the
effect on employment is the same. There are, however, important distinctions. It makes sense
to produce in the market in which the product is sold. Further, there may be significant cost
savings in transportation and tariffs. Finally, the product may be better received if marketed
locally. If attempts to stop the more clear case of the runaway shop prove inadequate,
however, the government could make some attempt to regulate this type of production. See
infra note 417 and accompanying text for a discussion of exports and their effect on domestic
labor policy.
120 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of
runaway shops on American interests.
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by the fact that the federal government makes no attempt to gather
information on the extent to which companies are replacing do-
mestic employment through foreign facilities. 11" Private firm activity
is protected as confidential.' 25
 Some estimates are possible, but the
exact figures are not nearly as important as recognition that this
type of activity directly undermines labor policy and provides a
clear basis for questioning the traditional assumption that American
MNCs are acting 'consistently with broader American interests.' 26
According to the federal government's General Accounting
Office estimate, forty-five percent of all plant closures or layoffs are
due to high labor costs.' 27 The federal government estimates that
10.8 million jobs were lost due to plant closures or permanent
layoffs for all reasons between 1981 and 1986. 128 These figures
mean that roughly 4.9 million American workers lost their jobs
during that period because their wages were too high.
From a labor policy perspective, this impact is staggering. While
many of the workers are able to find other work, the evidence
indicates that the jobs tend to be manufacturing jobs.' 29 Further,
the jobs created tend to be lower paying service-type positions.'"
Along with this shift, union membership has declined as heavily
unionized manufacturing jobs are replaced with non-unionized ser-
vice jobs. 131
The 4.9 million jobs lost to high American labor costs do not
equate precisely with runaway shops seeking refuge in developing
12' See, e.g., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 26-27. Congress passed a
statute to attempt to monitor this activity but never implemented it. See supra notes 104-05
and accompanying text for a discussion of this statute.
125 See, e.g., BERGSTEN, 1IORST & MORAN, supra note 107 at 89.
13" For a discussion of the extent of this assumption, see infra notes 363-84 and the
accompanying text.
127 GAO, PLANT CLOSINGS—LIMITED ADVANCE NOTICE AND ASSISTANCE PROVIDED DIS-
LOCATED WORKERS 20 (1987).
128
 Id. at 2.
129 Id. at 18, 21 (approximately 60% of the jobs lost were manufacturing jobs).
130 See, e.g., CAVANAUGH, TRADES H WHEN COSTS—WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD
ECONOMY 25 (1988) [hereinafter CAVANAUGH]; C. HAAS, PLANT CLOSURES—MYTHS, REALMES,
AND RESPONSES 28-31 (1985); Rudolph, All Hands on Deck, TIME, Sept. 18, 1988, at 1.
That other jobs may be available is not necessarily an optimum solution. The temptation
to deal in cold statistics ignores that many loyal, hardworking people are losing jobs through
no fault of their own. This can be devastating to the individual involved. See, e.g., B.
BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 45.
' 31 See, e.g., The Return of Inequality, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 89-90 (,tune 1988). See also
S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) (report submitted by Senator Kennedy
indicating that blue collar workers in heavy industry have been hit the hardest by plant
closings).
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countries, as some of the companies go completely out of business
or simply reduce their American operations. Many companies, how-
ever, do transfer their operations to gain access to low wage workers,
using the many incentives provided by trade policy, 132 and then
export their products back to the United States. The only possible
measure of this from existing information is the extent to which
American companies import products to resell. One 1982 estimate
is that forty-six percent of all U.S. imports are from affiliates of
American companies producing goods in a foreign country for
export to the United States.'"
Specific industries provide numerous examples. For example,
focusing on the automobile industry, in 1984, General Motors im-
ported 160,000 cars from Japan for sale in the United States, and
has recently begun importing from Korea.'" Ford imports cars
from Germany, and will soon bring in cars from Mexico and Ko-
rea.'" Chrysler also imports cars from Mexico.'" Numerous ex-
amples exist in other industries.'" This type of foreign investment
has a direct impact on American labor policy because American
workers are being displaced by production using cheaper, unpro-
tected foreign labor, and the goods are displacing goods formerly
produced in the United States.
3. The Chilling Effect on Labor Rights Stemming from Plant
Closures
The relocation of many companies to developing countries
creates the looming possibility that a company may follow suit. This
"2 See text accompanying notes 231-325, infra, for a discussion of trade policies that
provide incentives for American companies to abandon the United States.
"5 Mastering the World Economy: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 48-50 (1987) (statement of Owen Biber, President UAW).
One study indicates that in 1982, an MNC brought in 50% of all imports. Of this 50%,
57% were shipped by an unaffiliated foreign company to a U.S. multinational, 34% were
shipped by foreign affiliates to their U.S. parent, and 8% were shipped by foreign affiliates
of U.S. multinationals to unaffiliated U.S. companies. Barker, U.S. Merchandise l'rade Associated
with U.S. Multinational Companies, 186 SURV. CURRENT Bus. 55, 68 (May 1986). See• also B.
BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 44, asserting that 29% of all U.S. imports in
1976 "came from the output of overseas plants and majority-owned subsidiaries of American
multinational corporations.").
134 Finn & Healy, We've Met the Enemy, and They are U.S.?, FORBES, Feb. 9, 1987, at 78,
83.
155 Id. at 83.
IN, Id.
137 See infra notes 374-80 and accompanying text for some examples.
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also impacts several crucial labor rights, most notably the rights to
form a union, to bargain collectively, and to strike.' 38
A fundamental concept in labor law is that an employer may
not threaten or coerce employees in order to encourage them to
reject a union. Such a threat is a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA. 139
 Thus, a simple threat that the employer would move to
Mexico if the employees voted to have a union would be unlawful. 14°
If the employer, however, could cite objective facts that other similar
industries were forced to close down after a union organized the
workers, the threat to move would probably be permissible."' Such
a prediction would obviously have a tremendous effect on the work-
ers.
A related situation arises in the context of collective bargaining.
An employer seeking concessions may raise the possibility of a
relocation to a developing country as a necessary alternative if labor
refuses to make requested concessions.' 42 This type of threat is very
effective in suppressing protected rights. 143
Finally, in an international economy, the right to strike is greatly
diluted. The employer's first response to a strike might be to trans-
fer operations out of the country. Further, a company can wait out
a strike indefinitely if alternative production is available from other
plants around the world.'" Such tactics effectively remove the right
to strike as an effective bargaining tool for workers, a development
that has profound implications.
While many would certainly assert that these developments
have been positive, these threats to statutory labor rights have not
resulted from a policy decision by Congress. Instead, they are the
result of a void in policy due to the failure to recognize the impli-
cations of the international economy.' 43 If overall American inter-
138 Section 7 of the NLRA protects all of these rights. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The failure
to permit the exercise of any of the rights would be a violation of §§ 8(a)-8(a)(1) for any
interference with the right of association, 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) for the failure to bargain in
good faith and the interference with the right to bargain, and 8(a)(1) for an interference
with the right to strike. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). Section 13 expressly preserves the right to
strike. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982).
132 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
140 See id. at 618-19.
11 See id. at 618; NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1967).
"2 See, e.g., CAVANAUGH, supra note 130, at 2.
"3 See id.
1 " See, e.g., BERGSTEN, HORST & MORAN, supra note I07, at 100; B. BLuEs -roNE & B.
HARRISON, supra note 13, at 166-70.
'" See infra notes 355-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of
Congress's failure to recognize the implications of the international economy.
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ests would be advanced by a systematic dilution of American worker
rights, then such a policy should be pursued openly after careful
consideration.
B. The Moral Issue — Exploitation of Workers in Developing Countries
Given the historic antagonism between management and la-
bor,'" it is perhaps naive to expect humanitarian concerns to influ-
ence the working conditions American MNCs impose on their op-
erations in developing countries. This is especially true because of
the reason that many of these companies leave the United States
for foreign destinations — to avoid costly labor protections." 7 When
the labor conditions in most developing countries are considered,
however, it is not unreasonable to expect that American policy
would reflect the importance of these humanitarian concerns. If
Congress passed American labor legislation out of humanitarian
concerns for American workers, then it is difficult to understand
why those concerns are considered inapplicable to workers in the
developing countries, who are of different races and cultures.
One of the primary rationales for the NLRA was that unpro-
tected workers could not begin to assert themselves against the
power of the large manufacturers.'" Now, to a certain extent, these
same companies are dealing with uneducated, sometimes under-
nourished workers in developing countries."9 Further, labor policy
clearly expresses the idea that treating workers as expendable com-
modities is an unfair method of competition.m The values under-
lying labor legislation require the humane treatment of workers,
and these values are clearly threatened when only companies op-
erating within the jurisdiction of the United States are bound by
146 See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of working conditions
prior to the labor movement.
'" See supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of high
American labor costs. See also 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2577 (in discussing
whether to renew the overseas Private Investment Corp., Congress expressed concern that
low wages in developing countries would provide an incentive For capital flight).
148 See Supra text accompanying note 49 for a similar point about workers' power to
organize.
149
 Virtually every large U.S. manufacturer has a major presence in the developing
world. For a breakdown by country of U.S. companies operating in foreign countries, see
WORLD TRADE ACADEMY PRESS, DIRECTORY OP AMERICAN FIRMS OPERATING IN FOREIGN
Coutcrums (10th ed. 1984).
15° See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the humanitarian
purpose behind the FLSA legislation.
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the laws. This obviously provides a windfall to companies that have
fled the United States and penalizes those that have remained.
Hopefully, strong opposition would mount if American com-
panies reinstituted slavery, captured workers in an Asian country,
and forced them to labor without pay. The situation should not
have to reach that extreme before a sense of responsibility arises to
prevent exploitive practices. Until something is done to modify the
current situation, however, the race to the bottom will continue.' 5 '
Any problem of exploitive conditions in runaway shops in de-
veloping countries would be quite simple to remedy if American
labor law applied to employment practices abroad. It seems fairly
clear, however, that none of the primary statutes that comprise labor
policy applies outside of the United States. The FLSA' 52 expressly
provides, "The provisions of , .. this title shall not apply with respect
to any employee whose services during the work week are per-
formed in a workplace within a foreign country . . . ." 53 Similarly,
the NLRA' 54 has been interpreted to apply only within the territory
of the United States. 155 This limitation is a standard principle of
international law — no nation can extend its laws to interfere with
the internal concerns of another nation.' 56 Generally speaking, the
conditions under which citizens of a sovereign nation are employed
within that nation are the exclusive concern of that nation.' 57
One possible exception to this is that a nation may extend its
laws to protect its own citizens.'" Although it is by no means certain,
one commentator has concluded that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 would apply to protect American employees, even when
they are working abroad for American employers.' 59 This position
conflicts with Boureslan v. Aramco,m a 1988 decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Unfortunately, even
if Title VII did apply to American workers abroad, it does not
' 51 See CAVANAUGH, supra note 130, at x—xi.
152
 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-214 (1988).
153
 Id. § 213(f ).
' 51 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
155 See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Darlington, a decision
interpreting the NLRA.
L26 See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
1" Cf, United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
'" See The Apollon, 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) at 370.
'" Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Employers in the United
States and Abroad 19 N.Y.C." I NT'L L. & Pot.. 357, 370 (1987).
857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988).
December 1989]	 AMERICAN LABOR POLICY	 57
protect foreign workers, who are more likely to be laboring under
substandard conditions.
The goal is not to advocate the wholesale incorporation of the
American labor system. Rather, it is to illustrate that if a large
differential exists between labor conditions in the first and third
worlds, MNCs, if left unregulated, have an incentive to seek out the
cheapest labor. While some. free market theorists certainly would
applaud this development and argue that the market is well served
by such efficiencies," the policy question is whether American
interests are best served when MNCs are free to seek out the chea-
pest labor in the world and still have complete access to American
markets.
Further, regardless of the link to runaway shops, the human
rights dimension cannot be ignored. While slavery or some form of
subsistence wages might be very economically efficient, it is a firm
component of American policy to intervene on behalf of workers.
The humanitarian concerns cannot be any less compelling simply
because a different set of people are now being exploited. When
American companies take advantage of these systematic denials of
worker's rights, and actively encourage or require the suppression
of those rights, this suggests a level of moral culpability that should
be handled as a matter of American policy; American workers are
losing their jobs so that MNCs can increase their profits through a
return to inhumane labor practices. Several of the trade benefits
laws that encourage American investment abroad do attempt to
impose minimum standards on working conditions as a precondi-
tion to receiving the benefits, but these efforts have suffered from
ineffective enforcement. 162
This article will now discuss labor conditions in select devel-
oping countries to illustrate the incentive for MNCs to relocate, and
to establish that the conditions are so far removed from a standard
of humane treatment that they violate the underlying values of labor
policy on a moral level. The conditions bear a striking similarity to
those in this country early in this century. Further, in competing
against American companies that do respect labor rights, these
MNCs have an unfair advantage. Petitions from various groups to
have trade benefits revoked in most of the developing world provide
161 See supra note 22 for a discussion of the free market.
'" See infra notes 269-7J and accompanying text for a discussion of a trade benefits law
that suffers from inadequate enforcement.
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graphic details of inadequate protections of worker rights in those
countries. 163 The following are just a few examples of systematic
repression of worker rights.
1. Examples of Labor Conditions in Developing Countries
a. The Right to Organize
The right to organize is a fundamental feature of any system
to protect labor rights.' 64
 The workers must be free to associate
with one another and choose a representative, and to be legally
protected from retaliation for union organizing activities. 165
 These
basic rights are lacking in many developing countries where there
is substantial American investment.
Malaysia is one of the major contenders to join the ranks of
newly industrialized countries.' 66 One of Malaysia's primary indus-
tries is the manufacture of semiconductors. It is now the world's
third largest producer, following the United States and Japan.' 67
Virtually all of the world's major computer chip companies have
manufacturing facilities there, including large American compa-
nies.' 68 One of the primary reasons the MNCs are drawn to Malaysia
is that there is not a single union in any of the computer chip
165 The AFL-CIO and America's Watch filed extensive petitions in 1987 and 1988 with
specific examples of labor repression in many developing countries as part of the process to
attempt to have the GSP benefits of the offending countries revoked. See infra note 169 for
a citation to one of these petitions. Further, there are extensive examples of labor repression
in developing countries, especially Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the Republic of Korea.
Hearings on Worker Rights, supra note 39, at 24-29, 72-73, 82-135, 140-80, and 195-227.
161
 The right to organize is expressly protected by section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982). Further, it is codified in the International Labor Organization ("ILO") conven-
tions. International Labour Organization Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Right to
Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257; International Labour
Organization Convention (No. 11) Concerning the Rights of Association and Combination
of Agricultural Workers, Nov. 12, 1921, as modified by the Final Articles Revision Conven-
tion, 1946, 38 U.N.T.S. 153.
' 63 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
' 66 See, e.g., Asia's Emerging Superstar, NEWSWEEK (Asia Ed.) June 27, 1988, at 6, 7 (dis-
cussing Thailand, and pointing out that the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are com-
peting with Thailand to attract investment and develop their export economies).
167 Labor Trends in Malaysia — September 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987, paper prepared by
the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at 4 (1987).
' 66
 Interview with Terry A. Breese, First Secretary-Economics, Embassy of the United
States in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia ( July 7, 1988).
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companies.' 69 The union free environment is maintained by a num-
ber of government policies designed to keep the industry union
free to attract foreign investment.
The first impediment is that under the Malaysian Trade Unions
Act of 1959, 170 any trade union seeking to organize a group of
workers must be approved by the registrar.' 7 ' The registrar may
refuse to register a union if another trade union exists that repre-
sents employees in the "particular trade, occupation or industry" in
which the union seeking registration is proposing to organize work-
ers.' 72 The registrar has interpreted this language to give him the
power, by implication, to refuse to register a union if it is not
appropriate for the "particular trade, occupation or industry"; for
example, the trucker's union cannot represent machinists.'"
The effect of this law in the computer chip industry has been
refusals by the registrar to register the traditional "electrical work-
ers" union to organize the computer chip workers because they
were not the same "trade, occupation or industry." 174 Because the
electrical workers were the closest established union and they were
prevented from organizing, no other experienced unions have been
able to operate in the industry.'"
Responding to a possible loss of duty-free benefits under the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 176 the Malaysian government recently
indicated a willingness to open. up the computer chip industry to
unions.'" Upon hearing this, one "western trade official" was
quoted as saying, "The electronic guys have said if the unions come
in, they'll leave."'" In response to this type of threat by the MNCs,
the government returned to its former position.'"
169 Worker Rights and The Generalized System of Preferences: The AFL-CIO Petition to the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative at 54 (1988) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Petition]; Interview with A.
Murugavell, Assistant Director General, Dept. of Labor (Malaysia), in Kuala Lumpur, Ma-
laysia ( July 6, 1988).
170 Laws of Malaysia, Act 262 (1981).
171 Id. at	 8(1).
172
 See id. at § 12(2).
1 " See AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 55; Interview with A. Murugavell, supra note
169.
174
 See AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at. 55.
173
 See id.
176
	 a discussion of this review process, see text accompanying notes 264-83, infra.
177 134 CONG. REC. E3588-03 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Pease).
178 Id,
179
	 Dreaming of the Forty-Hour Work Week, THE NATION, May 15, 1989, at 658,
659.
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This series of events illustrates the nature of the problem —
American and other foreign firms are in Malaysia because the gov-
ernment discourages union formation. The companies are well or-
ganized through the Malaysian-American Electronics Industry As-
sociation,'" and they are successfully manipulating the system that
allows them to hire non-union labor, and export a large portion of
the finished product back to the United States) 81
A further hindrance to union organization fostered by a gov-
ernment policy to encourage foreign investment at the expense of
worker rights is that a company labeled a "pioneer enterprise" 82 is
exempt from collective bargaining over any terms and conditions
of employment established by the Employment Act of 1955) 83 No
collective agreement may contain terms more favorable to workers
than those contained in the Employment Act,'" thus removing a
major incentive for employees to join unions. The Malaysian gov-
ernment is currently considering a provision to ban labor unions
entirely from pioneer enterprises.' 85
The final major tactic used to discourage union formation in
Malaysia, and certainly the most barbaric, is retaliation against union
organizers. This takes two forms: discharge of employees engaged
in union organizing and government arrest of union leaders. Dis-
charge of union employees is, like in the United States, technically
illegal in Malaysia.' 86 Enforcement, however, is quite weak.' 87
The arrest of union leaders obviously involves the complicity
of government and demonstrates the precarious state of worker
rights in Malaysia. Among those victimized by this repressive policy
I" See 134 Cow.. Rcc. E3588-03 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Pease).
See id.
I " Section 15(2) of the Industrial Relations Act of 1967 defines a pioneer enterprise as
either an enterprise so labeled by the Investment Incentives Act or one that the Minister of
Labor identifies as such. Industrial Relations Act of 1967, Act 177, at § 15(2) (Malaysia 1967).
I " Employment Act of 1955, Act 265 (Malaysia 1955). The Act sets the minimum
standards for employment conditions including terminations (sections 12-14), payment of
wages (sections 18-23), maternity protections (sections 37-44), holidays (section 60d and
60e) and termination of benefits (section 60j).
184 Industrial Relations Act of 1967, Act 177, § 15(1) (Malaysia 1967).
1 " Interview with Terry A. Breese, First Secretary-Economics, Embassy of the United
States in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia ( July 7, 1988).
1 B 6 Industrial Relations Act of 1967, Act 177, § 5 (Malaysia 1980) (prohibiting various
forms of retaliation against union organizers or employees who join a union).
I" The primary problem is that the employer can advance an alternative reason for the
discharge, and because the burden of proof is on the employee, he seldom prevails. Interview
with K.P. Gengadharan Nair, a Barrister who represents employees, in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia ( July 6, 1988),
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was Dr. V. David, the General Secretary of the Malaysian Trades
Union Congress. 188 Dr. David's position is roughly the Malaysian
equivalent of being President of the AFL-CIO, as the Malaysian
Trades Union Congress is a society of all trade unions in Malaysia.'"
Dr. David was arrested immediately upon his return from the
United States after he addressed the annual convention of the AFL-
CIO and criticized his government's record on worker rights and,
more broadly, human rights.'" Dr. David was detained for seven
months and was released only after he repudiated his statements
criticizing the Malaysian government. The government maintains
that the arrest was "political" and was not done to suppress worker
rights.' 91 The practice of arresting union leaders is not unique to
Malaysia.' 92 It is also somewhat reminiscent of early American labor
history when fictitious charges were issued against union organizers
who were subsequently imprisoned.'"
Other developing countries have conditions similar to those in
Malaysia. In Thailand, another country with substantial American
and other multinational investment,' 94 the law does not technically
protect a union organizer until the union is formed.' 9' Thus, work-
ers must organize in secret or risk discharge, blacklisting or worse.
Further, even if the law is violated when a union leader is dis-
charged, remedies are inadequate and often do not include rein-
statement. 19"
In Indonesia, a third Southeast Asian country competing for
foreign investment,'`" the right to organize was effectively repressed
1 " AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 46-47; Interview with Dr. V. David in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia ( July 8, 1988).
18" Interview with Dr. V. David in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia ( July 8, 1988).
1" Id. The government's position apparently is that he was arrested for pantica/ activities,
not labor activities. Id.
"11 /d. Dr. David indicated that he signed the statement repudiating his criticisms only
after threats were made to arrest other officers in the Malaysia Trades Union Congress.
Interview with Dr. V, David in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia ( July 8, 1988).
192 e.g., CAVANAUGII, supra note 130, at X, 36-38 (describes arrests and in some cases
murders of union leaders in Chile, Turkey, El Salvador, Korea and Guatemala). See also
Hearings on Worker Rights, supra note 39, at 97-106 (statement by AFL-CIO submitted in GSP
review). •
110 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of arrest to
suppress labor strikes.
194 See supra note 165.
199 Interview with Professor Nikom Chandravithum, Professor of Law at Thammasat
University in Bangkok, Thailand, Chairman, National Tripartite Advisory Council on Man-
power Development and former Director-General of the Department of Labour, in Bangkok,
Thailand ( June 21 and 29, 1988) [hereinafter Interview with Professor Nikom].
"A AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 67-68.
17 See supra note 165.
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when the government nationalized the umbrella group for all In-
donesian trade unions. It is now controlled by the government and
any independent voice by the workers has been eliminated.' 98 Fur-
ther, if the government owns any shares in a particular business, it
is transformed into a public sector enterprise and unions are
banned. ' 99
b. The Right to Bargain Collectively
The right of workers to bargain collectively with their employer
is another basic ingredient of labor rights in the industrialized
world.'" Collective bargaining is effectively denied in many devel-
oping countries. The primary preventive device is to take steps to
insure that unions are never formed.'" Other practices are utilized
as well.
In Malaysia, the law expressly sets maximum terms and con-
ditions of employment in "pioneer enterprises," thus depriving
workers of the right to bargain over those terms. 202 Collective bar-
gaining is further limited because if agreement cannot be reached,
either party can seek conciliation with the Director General of La-
bor. 203 If that fails, the Minister of Labor may refer the matter to
the Industrial Court for compulsory arbitration. 204 The Industrial
Court utilizes fixed formulas to award any wage increases, and the
formulas are so low that the procedure is stacked against unions
and denies them any meaningful right to bargain collectively. 205
"8 AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 29.
L99 Id. at 32-33. In practice, the government applies this ban if any member of the
government owns a portion of the company in his private capacity. This practice encourages
companies to solicit high ranking government officials to invest in the company for a nominal
amount. Interview with Jeff Ballinger, Country Director for Asian-American Free Labor
Institute, in Jakarta, Indonesia ( July 14, 1988).
20° For example, the right is protected by § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1982). It is also expressly incorporated in ILO Convention No. 98. International Labour
Organization Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collec-
tively, July I, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
20 ' See supra notes 163-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of government policies
in foreign countries designed to prevent the formation of unions.
202 See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impediments
to collective bargaining in Malaysia.
203 Industrial Relations Act of 1967, Act 177, § 18 (Malaysia 1980). The Act explains
that when there is a "trade dispute" either party may report the situation to the Director
General. Id. at § 18(1). A "trade dispute" exists when there is a refusal to collectively bargain.
Id. at § 13(7).
2°4 Id. at § 26(2).
"5 AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 59. This was confirmed by interviews with several
Malaysian labor lawyers. E.g., Interview with N. Brabagarun, a lawyer with the Transport
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In Indonesia, collective bargaining is limited by the fact that
the government controls the unions through the All-Indonesia
Workers Union. 2"6
 The government has initiated a policy to form
joint working agreements, rather than collective bargaining agree-
ments, to reflect more accurately the relationship between manage-
ment, labor and government."'
Thailand requires by law that union representatives must be
full time employees. 208
 This was allegedly designed to keep outside
agitators away, 2°9
 but has the effect of severely limiting the ability
of union representatives to engage in collective bargaining.
c. The Right to Strike
The only true and available weapon that workers have to secure
improvements in their working conditions is the strike. It is so
fundamental to the American system that the NLRA expressly pro-
vides that "[n]othing in this Act . shall be construed so as either
to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike . . ."210
The right to strike is severely restricted in many countries of
the developing world. Such acts of protest are sometimes defined
as political opposition, and are treated severely. 211 T he most com-
mon method of restricting the right to strike is by imposing a system
of compulsory mediation in lieu of the right of strike. For example,
in Malaysia, once the Minister of Labor refers a trade dispute to
the Industrial Court, strikes and lockouts are forbidden. 212 Further,
if during the recognition phase of attempting to organize workers,
the recognition question is referred to the Minister of Labor, the
Workers Union, in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia (July 9, 1988) (Mr. Brabagarun indicated that
particularly in areas of wage increases, the company has no incentive to bargain because the
Industrial Court utilizes a wage increase chart that always requires awards less than the
union's demand); Interview with V.T. Nathan, a management lawyer with Shearn Delaware
& Cu,, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (July 5, 1988) (Mr. Nathan stated similarly that the
government's wage increase policy is such that the union's demands are always higher and
the company can always do better by refusing to bargain and going before the Industrial
Court.).
2011
 See text accompanying note 197, supra, for a discussion of the right to organize in
Indonesia.
2°7
 AFL -CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 35-36.
2°8
 Id. at 68-69.
2" interview with Professor Nikom, supra note 195.
21 " 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982).
211
 In Taiwan, strikes in defiance of restrictions set by martial law may be punished by
death. CAVANAUGH, supra note 130, at 3.
212
 Industrial Relations Act of 1967, Act 177, at § 44(6) (Malaysia 1967).
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workers may not strike while the Minister reviews the matter. 2 " In
addition, a recognition decision by the Minister is final and may not
be reviewed by a court. 214 Any strike to protest the Minister's deci-
sion is likewise illega1. 2 " A similar system exists in Indonesia, where
the right to strike is severely limited. 216
A more direct way of restricting the right to strike is employer
self-help. As an extreme example of this, in Korea recently, officials
of the Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. were charged
with arranging the abduction of a union leader to undermine the
union's strike attempt. 217
d. Minimum Wages and Hours
The restrictions on worker rights discussed above are simply
means to prevent gains in wages and working conditions, which is
the main issue that attracts investment to developing countries. The
figures are staggering, and certainly cannot be considered in light
of the cost of living in the industrialized world. Even by the poverty
standards in the developing countries, however, a large portion of
the workers are severely underpaid.
In Mexico, a simple border line away from Texas and Califor-
nia, workers employed directly by U.S. employers in a Maquiladora
arrangement2 " were paid an average of 80 cents per hour in
1986. 219 In the developing countries of Southeast Asia, wages are
substantially lower. 22" The differential in wages is the primary at-
2 " Id. at § 10(1).
214
	 at § 9(6).
215
	 at § 10(1).
211 See AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 36.
217 E.g., Korea Times, June 5, 1988, at 6, col. I.
211 For an explanation of the Maquiladora program, see infra notes 314-17 and accom-
panying text.
211 GODSMAW,	 SCHINK & SINGH, THE IMPLICATION FOR 'THE U.S. ECONOMY
OF TARIFF SCHEDULE ITEM 807 AND MEXICO'S MAQUILA PROGRAM, paper prepared for the
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of International Economic Affairs, at 3 (1988).
220 In lndonesia's capital Jakarta, the average monthly wage in 1986 was 122,000 rupiah,
which, based on the current (April 2, 1989) exchange rate of 1,344 rupiah to the dollar, is
$90.77 per month. See LABOR TRENDS IN INDONESIA, paper prepared by the American
Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, at 6 (1987). The 1986 minimum wage in Jakarta was 1,300
rupiah per day, or 98 cents per day. In Yogyakarta, a Javanese regional capital, the minimum
wage in 1986 was 450 rupiah per day or 33 cents per day. Id.
In Thailand, 1986 figures indicate that 21.9% of the entire workforce earns less than
the minimum wage of 73 Bah' per day, or 3.21 dollars at '22.74 Baht per dollar. PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF THE LABOUR STATISTICS 1987, DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, MINISTRY OF' INTERIOR,
'THAILAND, at 46, Table 6.1 (1987). 45.4% of the workforce earned 75 Baht (3.30 dollars) or
less a day in 1986. Id.
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traction luring MNCs to the developing countries. When the wages
are kept low because of suppression of worker rights, however, and
the workers are in some cases barely able to survive, the issue
becomes much more complicated than a free market approach to
labor costs would suggest.
e. 'Human Rights Violations in the Workplace in Developing Countries
Perhaps human rights is the area that most clearly demonstrates
that a moral issue is at stake that goes beyond simply allowing
companies to find the cheapest labor under the most favorable
conditions. MNCs that take the most aggressive attitude towards
exploiting local practices are able to discriminate freely based on
sex and utilize child labor.
American laws do not generally extend beyond the borders of
the United States. 221 Therefore, companies that discriminate in hir-
ing women technically do not violate American law. This practice is
widespread in developing countries. For example, several major
American-based MNCs recently placed advertisements in Bangkok
and Hong Kong newspapers seeking employees based on gender-
specific ads, sometimes specifying a preference in age and marital
status. 222 While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might
reach these companies if they were discriminating against American
citizens, 223 foreign victims of discrimination by American companies
currently have no remedy as long as the discrimination occurs out-
side of the territorial reach of the United States.
The exploitation of child labor is perhaps an even more basic
question of morality. While documentation of the problem is diffi-
cult because of lack of information, the problem is widespread,
particularly in the textile and garment industries.224 Companies
seeking cheap workers are able to find them in many cases because
children are performing the tasks.
221 Sec supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited appli-
cation of American labor law.
222 E .g Bangkok Post, June 24, 1988, at 38, col. I (Unocal ad for Computer Operator
specifying "male, age not over' 26"); The Nation (Bangkok), June 16, 1988, at 35, col. I (Esso
ad for Marketing Executive Trainee specifying "male, age not over 35"); Bangkok Post, June
19, 1988, at 39 (Northwest Airlines ad for flight attendants specifying "Thai females, 20-25
years old ... single"); South China Morning Post, June 14, 1988, at 6, col. 3 (Gould Electronics
ad for Junior Secretary/Receptionist specifying "female ... pleasant personality"); id. (Na-
tional Panasonic ad for Sales Engineer, specifying "male").
2" See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible
extended application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
224 See, e.g., AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 169, at 37, 75-76.
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2. Consequences of Moral Violations
One of the apparent consequences of MNC investment in de-
veloping countries is that a downward spiral in labor conditions of
some developing countries has begun. 225 Developing countries are
bidding against each other to offer the cheapest, union free labor
force in order to attract investment. 226 This has created an oppor-
tunity for companies in labor intensive industries to take advantage
of the situation and transfer operations to obtain the lowest possible .
labor costs. In doing so, however, the companies are in many cases
returning to labor practices long illegal in this country. Further,
regardless of any technical legal application, there is a greater harm
occurring when companies utilize inhumane and sometimes brutal
practices in order to keep labor costs low.
A valid argument certainly exists that developing countries
benefit from industrialization. If that is the goal, however, there is
little justification for allowing workers to be exploited until they can
somehow assert themselves, presumably after a long, bloody strug-
gle similar to the labor movement in this country. 227 The only ben-
eficiaries of this system are the MNCs that can take advantage of
the short term access to cheap labor. There is every reason to believe
that the MNCs who invest in developing countries because of the
cheap labor will no longer be interested when the workers begin to
make progress towards achieving protection from exploitation. 228
If it is the policy of the United States to "develop" these under-
developed countries through private enterprise, then this policy
must be considered in light of its impact on labor policy. In spite of
efforts to impose minimum standards for worker rights in devel-
oping countries, 229 the conditions discussed still exist.
The flight of MNCs from the United States is directly related
to the lack of worker rights in developing countries. American
workers simply cannot compete on a cost basis with workers in
225 See, e.g., CAVANAUGH, supra note 130, at 2.
225 The countries are not doing this without reason. For example, when the government
of Malaysia indicated that they would allow the semiconductor industry to become unionized,
the MNCs threatened to leave. Sec supra note 177 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the effect of unionization in Malaysia.
227
	 supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the early labor
movement in the United States.
228 See, e.g., supra note 177 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
unionization in Malaysia.
229 See infra notes 269-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of workers' rights in
developing countries.
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countries willing to sacrifice the health, safety, and well-being of
their workers, because of the clear American policy of elevating
workers to a status beyond an exploitable resource. As Congressman
Pease put it, "[W]e cannot afford to tolerate . . . a trading system
that pits American workers in dog-eat-dog competition with the
lowest common international denominator on worker rights."230
IV. TRADE POLICIES THAT PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR AMERICAN
COMPANIES TO ABANDON THE UNITED STATES
The preceding section discussed the impact on American labor
policy due to the shifting of production to developing countries. If
this were occurring without any policy-based support and had a
negative impact on labor policy, the problem would be quite simple
to solve. Other competing policies, however, also have the effect of
encouraging American companies to transfer production to devel-
oping countries.
To resolve this conflict, it is necessary to determine whether
Congress, by enacting policies that have the effect of undermining
labor policy by encouraging investment in developing countries,
intended this result. The purpose for these policies must be ex-
amined to determine whether any overriding policies justify the
impact on labor policy. The language of the statutes, along with the
legislative history, establish that Congress had quite the opposite
intent and was sensitive to any negative effects on labor policy. The
statutes instead are typical examples of legislation designed to ad-
vance business and in turn, to improve domestic employment, but
Congress was acting without questioning the premise that business
will always act consistently with American interests. Although other
policies have the effect of encouraging American investment
abroad,231
 all of which will have some impact on labor policy, the
trade and tariff statutes are particularly good examples. They illus-
trate the direct impact on labor policy when American companies
manufacture in developing countries to displace American workers
and export the products back to the United States. 232
22 " Workers' Rights and Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs; Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1987).
"I See generally, BERGSTEN, HORST & MORGAN, supra note 107, at 22-31 (discussing a
variety of policies that have an effect on the degree of foreign investment by Americans,
including tax, monetary, antitrust, development and expropriation relief).
232 See supra notes 121-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
replacing domestic production with foreign production.
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This section discusses the trade and tariff statutes that have a
significant impact on labor policy and establishes the purpose of
each. Then, it discusses both dimensions of the impact on labor
policy, along with evidence of Congressional intent to avoid any
impact. The section concludes with suggestions for pursuing the
express goals of each statute while preserving labor rights.
A. Tariff Benefits For Exports From Developing Countries.
1. The Purpose of the Statutes
The United States has two statutory systems to give duty-free
status to select products exported to the United States — The
Generalized System of Preferences of The Trade Act of 1974
("GSP") 233 and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
("CBERA"). 234 Both have as their primary goal the assistance of
developing countries in improving economically. 235
The GSP created a system to provide trade benefits to devel-
oping countries. One of the primary factors considered in desig-
nating a country as a "beneficiary developing country" is "the level
of economic development of such country, including its per capita
gross national product, the living standards of its inhabitants, and
any other economic factors which [the President] deems appropriate
• . • ""6 When the Act was substantially amended in 1984, among
the stated purposes was the desire to
(1) promote the development of developing countries, which
often need temporary preferential advantages to compete
effectively with industrialized countries; [and]
(4) allow for the consideration of the fact that there are
significant differences among developing countries with
respect to their general development and international
competitiveness. 237
The extensive list of countries designated as "beneficiary developing
countries" reflects the stated goal of helping the non-industrialized
world get a start in the competitive world markets. 238
258
	 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1986).
234 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1986).
2" Id. § 2462(c)(2); Id. § 2702(c)(2).
2" Id. § 2462(c)(2).
2" Section 501(b) of the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-573 (1984) (emphasis added).
258 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(2) (requiring the president to list all eligible countries).
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Simply stated, a country must meet two requirements to be
eligible for benefits. 239 First the country must be designated, 24° and
second, the specific article exported must be on the list of eligible
items."' The provisions are quite liberal and attempt to further the
purpose of assisting the development of the eligible countries.
The CBERA is virtually identical to the GSP in its purpose and
operation. It allows anyone to get duty-free treatment242 of "eligible
articles"243 exported to the United States from any beneficiary coun-
try,244 all of which are located in the Caribbean basin. 243 All of the
countries that qualify for beneficiary status under the CBERA are
also eligible under GSP. 246 The main differences are that the
CBERA gives more liberal benefits. More products are eligible for
duty-free treatment than under the GSP, 247 and the GSP provides
for an automatic cutoff when the percentage of imports of a given
product from a beneficiary country reaches a specified leve1.248 Fi-
nally, the origin requirements under CBERA are more liberal, al-
lowing components to originate in places other than the developing
country. 249
2. Impact on Labor Policy
The GSP and CBERA potentially contribute to both dimensions
of the impact on labor policy.250 The first dimension, the loss of
jobs when companies transfer production to developing countries
to escape American labor regulation, is impacted because American
companies can qualify for duty-free benefits when they produce in
an eligible country and export eligible items to the United States.
No restriction on eligibility for benefits exists, so a local business is
259 Id.	 2461.
240 Id. § 2462..
241
	
§ 2463.
242 Id.	 2701.
296
	 § 2703.
244 Id. § 2702.
X95
	 2702(b).
216 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, TRADE AND EM-
PLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE CARRIBEAN BASIN ECONOMY RECOVERY ACT, SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 216 OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC
RECOVERY Act. 7 (1986) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S REPORT].
247 Id. at 8.
MS Id. at 9-10.
299
	 at 49-50.
"D For a discussion of the dimensions of labor policy impacted by foreign investment
designed to displace American workers, see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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on the same footing with a major MNC, provided it meets the two
criteria — the country is eligible and the product is an eligible item. 251
The second dimension, allowing the exploitation of workers in
developing countries, is also impacted when American companies
take advantage of GSP and CBERA to transfer production to de-
veloping countries. If the companies utilize exploitive labor prac-
tices, their ability to do so is in effect subsidized by American policy
as the companies receive trade benefits when they export products
back to the United States.
Congressional intent will be examined with respect to each
dimension to determine whether Congress intended to allow labor
policy to be undermined.
a. Loss of Jobs Due to Foreign Investment
It is unlikely that Congress intended through either GSP or the
CBERA to cause American workers to lose their jobs. Legislation
renewing GSP expressly provides that the goals be achieved in a
way that "does not adversely affect United States producers and work-
ers." 252 CBERA expressly requires annual reviews, including an ex-
amination of the domestic employment effects. 255 One of the ob-
vious underlying assumptions of these programs was that they
would help U.S. employment by increasing demand for exports.
GSP's statement of purpose indicates a goal of promoting the de-
velopment of developing countries to, among other things, "take
advantage of the fact that developing countries provide the fastest
growing markets for United States exports," and that foreign ex-
change earnings will allow developing countries to purchase United
States exports.254
Further, one of the factors the President must take into account
in deciding whether a particular country or product is eligible is
"the anticipated impact ... on United States producers of like or
directly competitive products." 255 These statements of purpose in-
dicate again the manifestation of a trickle down philosophy — the
programs were expected to help American businesses, and ulti-
t" See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of these criteria.
252
	
System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98.573,
501(b)( 10)(A) (1984).
2" 19 U.S.C. 2705 (1986).
254 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
§ 501(b)(3) (1984),
2s5
	 U.S.C. § 2461(3).
December 1989]	 AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 	 71
mately, workers, while contributing to the long term development
of developing countries.
If Congress had a clear intent not to adversely impact domestic
employment, it is difficult to justify the present form of the statutes.
Foreign investment done for the purpose of exporting to the United
States is one of the most clear examples of foreign investment that
impacts labor policy. Because the entire premise of the GSP and
CBERA program is to provide the benefit when the companies
export to the United States duty-free, any American company tak-
ing advantage of the program is by definition investing abroad for
the purpose of exporting back to the United States, and presumably
displacing American production. That the U.S. government actually
subsidizes this through duty-free benefits creates a conflict with
stated concerns about the impact on labor policy. Unfortunately,
the fact that a statute appears to conflict with its express purpose
does not normally provide a legal basis for challenge. 256
The only marginally satisfactory explanation is to speculate that
Congress knew exactly what it was doing and simply left a large
loophole for MNCs to exploit. 257 The final section provides an
extensive discussion of Congress' reasons for failure to act effec-
tively, despite its expressed concern for the loss of American jobs
due to foreign investment by American MNCs. 258 The need for a
fresh examination of the problem is well illustrated by considering
the express purpose of GSP and CBERA in comparison to the
realized potential for MNCs to gain a subsidy for their foreign
investment to displace American workers.
Modifying GSP and CBERA to incorporate more closely the
goal of protecting American workers would be fairly simple. If the
other objectives of GSP and CBERA could be accomplished without
sacrificing American workers, little justification remains for not
"fi Cf. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (that a statute's effect
conflicted with its express purpose did not provide a sufficient basis for attacking its rationality
under an equal protection analysis).
"7 See 131 CONG. REC. S17,478-02 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1985) (Senator Metzenbaum,
questioning the wisdom of renewing legislation for the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration (OPEC), remarked, We just do not have the courage to stand up when some of the
pressure lobbyists show up • . . [OPIC] insures U.S. multinational companies and banks on
their investments. By doing so, however, [OPEC] encourages the export of U.S. jobs, tech-
nology, and capital overseas. . object to a policy which cares not one iota about the true
needs of foreign nations but merely paves the way for some U.S. companies to set up
production overseas .. and compete with those U.S. firms who have stayed put . ").
236 See infra notes 360-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' failure
to protect American workers.
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making the changes, except to pursue the undemocratic goal of
benefiting American business regardless of the impact on American
workers. 259
The clear goal of providing duty-free status to products from
"beneficiary developing countries"260 is to give them a head start in
the world market until they can compete on an equal basis with the
developing world. 26 ' Further, as their industries develop, an in-
crease in demand for American equipment, supplies, and services
can be expected. This premise is flawed because the developing
countries already have a competitive advantage in labor intensive
industries, and to give them further price advantages -seems mis-
placed.
Regardless of the wisdom of the rationale of GSP and CBERA
as applied to developing countries, it certainly is not applicable to
highly developed MNCs, both foreign and American, that relocate
to developing countries to take advantage of the tariff benefits. This
is particularly true because the "competition" is American compa-
nies that have remained in the United States and utilize American
workers. As one writer put it, "we have met the enemy, and they
are us. "262
No policy basis exists to allow MNCs the right to export duty-
free to the United States. This is a clear situation where the goal of
the foreign production — to export to the United States — does
impact labor policy. 263
 Manufacturing by U.S. MNCs in developing
countries for export to the United States displaces American work-
ers.
This feature, which conflicts with labor policy, can easily be
removed without detracting from the purpose of the legislation:
259
 One possible argument that would attempt to justify the shifting of labor to developing
countries is that it is more cost efficient, and the savings will be passed on to the consumer.
There is little evidence, however, that savings are passed on to the consumer. See, e.g., R.
BARNNET & R. MOLLER, GLOBAL REACH - THE POWER OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
322 (1974). See also 117 Cosm. REC. H33,746 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1971) (remarks by Rep.
Burke that "U.S. consumers are paying American prices for American brand names, often
made by the cheapest labor in the world"). Further, even if this were true, it is not necessarily
a justification for exploiting labor. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the exploitation of workers in developing countries.
260
 The term conies from 19 U.S.C. § 2962 (1984) and 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (1986).
261 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of duties on products
exported to the United States.
262 Finn & Healy, We've Mel the Enemy , and They Are Us?, FORBES, Feb. 9, 1987, at 78.
263
 This is the most offensive sort of relocation from a labor policy perspective because,
by definition, it is a relocation for the purpose of manufacturing with cheap labor and
exporting back to the U.S. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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the benefits available from GSP and CBERA can be limited to
companies owned by local investors. Many possible variations would
accomplish the goal of preserving the benefits for "developing"
industries. For example, trade benefits that are simply the right to
export to the United States duty-free could be limited to new com-
panies started by local investors, fulfilling the goal of assisting the
developing countries to develop their own industries, A more gen-
erous plan could extend benefits to all locally owned companies
under the theory that the local industries need a subsidy to allow
them to become established in world markets.
To avoid subterfuge, a strict test of ownership would have to
be applied to ensure that the interest is locally owned. Perhaps a
small percentage could be foreign owned, but as that investment
increases, the reasons for providing a subsidy disappear. Of course,
the local ownership rule would exclude other foreign MNCs because
they should not be subsidized by the United States for the same
reasons. Further, to subsidize them, but not American companies,
would put American MNCs at an unfair disadvantage.
b. Impact on Worker Rights in Developing Countries
The second dimension of labor policy impacted by GSP and
CBERA presents a different problem. Congress expressly took steps
to prevent extreme exploitation of workers in developing countries.
Congress imposed as a condition for receiving development assis-
tance through GSP2"4 and CBERA 265 that the country receiving the
benefit must observe a specified standard for worker rights. The
problem is not the existence of the right, but instead its enforce-
ment. This section discusses the specific labor standards imposed
by these benefit programs and assesses their effectiveness in pre-
venting exploitation of workers in developing countries.
The first specific standards for worker rights were added as a
condition to eligibility for GSP. Section 2462(b)(7) provides that the
President "shall not" grant beneficiary status to a country "if such
country has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights to workers in the country ...........The Act
defines "internationally recognized worker rights" as:
2" 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1986). For a discussion of the benefits, see supra notes 233-
38 and accompanying text.
2°" 19 U.S.C. §§ '2701-2706 (1986). For a discussion of the benefits, see supra notes 239-
46 and accompanying text.
2 '" 19 U,S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1986).
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A. the right of association;
B. the right to organize and bargain collectively;
C. a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor;
D. a minimum age for the employment of children;
and
E. acceptable conditions of work with respect to min-
imum wages, hours of work, and occupation safety and
health."'
The CBERA has a more general provision, simply providing that
the President, in deciding whether a country is eligible for benefits,
shall consider "the degree to which workers in such a country are
afforded reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to
organize and bargain collectively . . . ,2268
The GSP standard, although much more specific than the
CBERA's, still leaves too much discretion for adequate enforcement.
The Reagan administration's record in making determinations
clearly illustrates that the law has been ineffective because of dis-
cretionary enforcement. Since 1984, the first year the Act was in
effect, President Reagan terminated the duty-free status of only two
countries — Nicaragua and Romania — and has suspended only
one, Paraguay.269
 The administration, after investigation, declined
to revoke the duty-free status of South Korea, Chile, Taiwan, Thai-
land, Turkey, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Singapore, Surinam
and Zambia, all of which were investigated based on petitions by
various organizations indicating a failure to meet the requirements
of the Act."° The AFL-CIO charged that the administration applies
"one standard to communist countries and another for noncom-
munist authoritarian regimes." 27 ' Others have criticized that the
administration fails to enforce the law against its allies. 272
 One need
not get into the politics of the matter to realize that the potential
for selective enforcement is apparent.
267 Id. 2462(a)(4).
268 Id. § 2702(c)(8).
269
 E.g., 136 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 ( July 17, 1987).
2 â Id. The President is required to conduct an annual review to ensure compliance with
all conditions required to receive benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(2)(A) (1986). Any "interested
party" may petition for the removal of any country for non-compliance with the terms of
the Act. 15 CFR § 2007.0 (1986).
27 ' 136 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 ( July 17,1987).
272 See e.g., Hearings on Worker Rights, supra note 39, at 70 (statement by Holly Burkhalter,
spokesperson for Helsinki Watch, America's Watch, and Asia Watch, that "[t]tle Administra-
tion has, for the most part, been reluctant to apply the labor rights conditions to countries
allied with the United States.").
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The law provides several opportunities for discretionary en-
forcement. While the Act speaks in mandatory terms, "the President
shall not designate any country a beneficiary developing country" if
it fails to "afford internationally recognized worker rights," 273 com-
plete discretion rests with the President as to whether a country has
met the vague requirements. This problem is exacerbated by the
large gap possible between legislation and actual conditions. 274
In addition, even if the requirements are admittedly not being
met, the President may still grant beneficiary status if a country is
"taking steps to afford" 275 the minimum standards. This, of course,
leaves considerable room for debate. If a country is simply discuss-
ing the possibility of legislation to enact workers' rights, the provi-
sion is arguably satisfied. 276 Further, disagreement exists over
whether "taking steps" requires concrete action in all five areas of
the standard, or just one. 2" The President has additional discretion
to grant express beneficiary status even if there are violations of
workers' rights "if the President determines that such designation
will be in the national economic interest of the United States .... "278
These problems are equally present in the more general standards
of the CBERA. 278
While GSP and CBERA have express provisions to prevent the
exploitation of workers, enforcement is hindered by discretionary
enforcement. The denial of minimum worker rights in developing
countries covered by the legislation illustrates that more effective
enforcement is needed. 28° Further clarification is needed to specify
circumstances under which the President may decline to enforce
2" 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7),
2" See, e,g., AFL - C10 Petition, supra note 169, at 3 (commenting on the large gap between
written law and actual conditions).
275 19 U.S.C. 2462(c)(7).
276 This principle is well illustrated by the debate over whether Chile's benefits should
have been suspended. The administration acknowledged that Chile was not in compliance,
was not "taking steps," but was perhaps taking steps to take steps. Hearings on Worker Rights,
supra note 39, at 62.
2" Compare id, at 37 (statement of Gerald T. West, Vice President of OPEC, which applies
the same standard as GSP, that "taking steps" means the country's laws "conform to one or
more of the five fundamental rights"), with id. at 183 (statement by Rep. Pease, the sponsor
of the worker rights language in GSP, that clear progress must be made in all five areas).
278 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1986). This provision contains a serious ambiguity because it is
not clear what the "economic interest" of the U.S, is, especially whets the interests of business
conflict with the interests of workers. See infra notes 374-84 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the ways that these interests may conflict.
27`'
	
supra note '266 and accompanying text for an example of one of these provisions.
266 See supra notes 146-224 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exploitation
of workers in developing countries.
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the law. If the statutes are going to be effective, discretion to decline
enforcement should be limited to economic aspects of the standard,
which do vary greatly from country to country, but not to absolute
rights. 28 ' Thus, the rights to associate, organize and bargain collec-
tively, as well as the prohibition on forced or compulsory labor,
should be absolute; the standards relating to minimum age for
children, minimum wages, maximum hours and standards for
health and safety could vary depending on local economic condi-
tions. if the former rights are protected, the bargaining process will
eventually take care of the latter ones. 282 By way of comparison,
once the rights to associate and act collectively were protected under
American law, workers made great strides in improving their situ-
ation.
Further, the "taking steps" language in GSP should not be used
so broadly as to excuse major noncompliance. One possible solution
to this would be to require a probation period to determine whether
proposed "steps" actually result in the attainment of the right by
workers. 283
B. OPIC-Financing Projects and Insuring the Risks when American
Companies Invest in Developing Countries
1. The Purpose of OPIC
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") is a
corporation with the status of an agency of the United States gov-
ernment. 284 Its purpose is "Rio mobilize and facilitate the partici-
pation of United States private capital and skills in the economic
and social development of less developed friendly countries and
areas . . . . "285 OPIC is empowered to "provide insurance, financing
261 See Hearings on Worker Rights, supra note 39, at 84-85 (statement by Rudy Oswald,
Director of Research, AFL-CIO, that the provisions of GSP should be interpreted so that
bask rights to associate, organize and collectively bargain should be absolute, while variable
issues, such as minimum wages, should he tailored to particular countries).
282 See id.
263 The Reagan administration used such a procedure under CSP with Chile, but it is
not clear whether the procedure was permitted under the law. Further, the "probation"
period was apparently designed to see if Chile would even take steps, not whether the steps
would result in the realization of worker rights. See Hearings on Worker Rights, supra note 39,
at 57-61.
284 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1986).
283 Id.
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or reinsurance"286 to all "eligible investor[s] "287 who participate in
approved projects. The corporation has great discretion in deciding
when to grant financial assistance to a proposed project, 288 subject
only to guidelines imposed by Congress in an attempt to provide
some consistency in policy objectives of the United States.'"
The program, putting it in its best light, is an optimistic attempt
to use private investment to develop the underdeveloped nations.
By providing incentives for American companies to invest in de-
veloping countries, OPIC seeks to create centers of capitalism where
the free market system will develop and ultimately advance Amer-
ican interests. In its worst light, it is legislation designed to facilitate
the exploitation of workers in developing countries by American
MNCs at the expense of American workers. 29°
Regardless of which view provides the motivation for OPIC,
the assumption is that the foreign investment will create a demand
for American products, particularly equipment and supplies, and
allow American business to expand by capturing a local market."'
These types of foreign investments may further American interests
and provide a sound policy justification. 292 Unfortunately, the OPIC
legislation fails to make a distinction between types of foreign in-
vestment. As with GSP and CBERA, the legislation fails to recognize
that some foreign investment will damage American interests. For
example, American companies may obtain financing and insurance
for a project to expand production in a developing country. Further,
it allows American companies to utilize cheap foreign labor at the
expense of American workers, often under inhumane conditions.
It is doubtful whether Congress left in this aspect of the legislation
on the naive assumption that American MNCs would act consis-
tently with American interests, because Senator Metzenbaum spoke
out about the danger to American employment in hearings to renew
OPIC's authorization. 2 't0 Perhaps Congress believed that the pre-
cautions built into the legislation would alleviate these problems.
286 Id.
2" Id. § 2198(c).
Zed
	 ad. § 2191.
"9 Id. § 2191(a).
22" See supra notes 226-29,257 and accompanying text for a discussion of the transfer
of American production to foreign countries.
291 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1986).
222 Sec supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of
American companies moving production to foreign countries.
229 See supra note 257.
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Both aspects of OPIC's potential impact on labor policy will be
discussed. In addition, Congress' attempts to prevent any conflict
and additional proposals to remove the conflict will be discussed.
2. The Potential for Displacing American Workers
Congress recognized the potential impact on American em-
ployment if companies could utilize OPIC benefits to directly dis-
place American workers. Congress expressly provided for this by
requiring OPIC to deny assistance to a project that would "signifi-
cantly reduce the number of .. . employees in the United States
because [the investor] is replacing his United States production with
production from [the foreign project] which involves substantially
the same product for substantially the same market as hiS United
States production . . . . "2" This restriction, if adequately enforced,
would at most prevent the loss of already existing jobs. No restric-
tion exists on expanding operations by building new production
facilities that would otherwise have been built in the United States,
and perhaps phasing out American production over a period of
several years.
A study required by Congress to assess the domestic employ-
ment impact of OPIC 295 illustrates the potential hidden impact on
labor policy from the legislation. The study claims that there were
no runaway shops among OPIC projects, 296 and that based on ag-
gregate figures for each year, 297 OPIC projects resulted in a positive
impact on U.S. employment. 298
The analysis has several problems that indicate its failure to
measure the full impact on American employment. First, by aggre-
gating the figures to conclude that in a given year the employment
impact was positive,299 the study seems to excuse any offsetting
"4 22 U.S.C. § 2191(k)(1) (1986). Congress also provided a more general restriction that
OPIC must decline to give assistance to a project if it is "likely to cause a significant reduction
in the number of employees in the United States." Id. at § 2191 ( 1 ).
295 See 22 U.S.C. § 2200a(a)(1). The report, A Study of the U.S. Effects of OPIC-Assisted
Private Investment Overseas, Contract Number OPIC-87-C-003 (December, 1987) [hereinafter
OPIC Report], contains a detailed statistical study.of the employment effects of OPIC projects.
296 OPIC Report, .supra note 295, at 1-4.
297 Id. at V-2—V-5. The study produces aggregate figures broken down by project types
to decide whether, in a particular year, the overall impact on employment was positive or
neutral. The study claims that there were no years with an overall negative impact, and only
a few projects with a negative impact. Id. at V-3.
298 See, e.g., id. at V-3.
299 E.g., id.
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negative employment that very well might be of the type designed
to displace American employment.
Second, the figures for each year include the employment gen-
erated by American exports to give the project its start. 3°° Thus,
this initial gain in U.S. employment offsets the employment that
may be lost by the project. In the future, however, there will be
little or no exports to the project, but it will continue producing
and displacing U.S. employment."'
Finally, and perhaps most important, any yearly snapshots of
statistics do not account for long term effects. Employers may not
modernize their U.S. plants as expansions are done in developing
countries. 302 This damages U.S. productivity and future capacity.
Further, when a company needs to phase out a plant ten or fifteen
years down the road, it may close the American facility rather than
a new facility in a developing country, particularly because the
American facility is more likely to experience labor difficulties.
The primary objection to OPIC projects from a labor policy
perspective is that they may allow an American company to displace
American production by producing in a developing country and
exporting to the United States. This problem could easily be ad-
dressed by denying grants to companies that will export to the
United States. Because OPIC awards are expressly limited to Amer-
icans or American companies, 303 the subsidy is not needed to help
the companies. 3 D 4 Instead, it serves as an incentive for American
companies to begin a venture that contains an element of risk, for
the purpose of developing industries locally that will import Amer-
ican products. 303 The proposed solution will not burden this goal,
but will obviously discourage projects by companies seeking to dis-
place their American production free of risks through OPIC ben-
efits.
Under the current system, applicants must provide information
on the estimated effects of the project on U.S. employment 3°6 and
30" E.g., id. at II.12 and V-2.
" See supra note 116 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of foreign
investment on American employment.
3u2 See B. BLUESTONF. & B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 41-46.
3"3 22	 2198(c).
304 OP1C clients include America's largest MNCs. Bechtel Group, Caterpillar Tractor
Cu., Citicorp, Exxon Corp., Ford Motor Co., General Electric Co., and General Motors Corp.
are among OPIC's current clients. OPIC, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 30-31.
3115 See supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of efforts to expand
the market for American products.
1" See 22 U.S.C. 2191(k)—(I) (1986).
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the impact on the U.S. trade balance."' Providing an analysis of
the intended market for goods produced in the project would not
be more burdensome for'companies legitimately seeking to assist in
the development of a local economy, and would help to make the
determinations already required. An applicant that could not iden-
tify a market or planned to export to the United States, would be
denied, and the incentive for full disclosure must be the certainty
that the goods would be banned from export to the United States.
3. Worker Rights in Developing Countries
To encourage compliance with accepted standards of worker
rights in developing countries that would be the site of OPIC proj-
ects, Congress expressly incorporated the GSP standards."' OPIC
often defers to the GSP determinations regarding compliance with
the standard."" The problems in enforcing the standard, and pro-
posed solutions, are exactly the same as those discussed in reference
to GSP.31 °
C. Special Tariff Incentives for U.S. Manufacturers to Transfer
Assembly Operations to Underdeveloped Nations — Item 800.00 of the
Tariff Schedules
Item 800.00 of the Tariff scheduless" permits American com-
panies to export unfinished goods to another country 312 for assem-
bly. The goods can then be returned to the United States where
duty is charged only on the value added by the assembly operations.
Through a series of tariff schedules, 313 the system is designed to
3°7
 Id. § 2191(m).
3" 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1) (Supp. 1989). The only distinction in the standard is that
under OPIC, a country will be in compliance if it "is taking steps to adopt and implement
laws that extend internationally recognized worker rights." Id. GSP has more ambiguous
language. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of this language.
30" Hearings on Worker Rights, supra note 39, at 38-40.
s'" See supra notes 266-80 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of GSP.
" I UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, TARIFF SCIIEDULES OF THE UNITED
SrAms ANNOTATED at Item 800.00 (1986). [hereinafter TARIFF SCHEDULES].
3 ' 2 Mexico, the Caribbean basin, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan are the
developing areas most commonly utilized for assembly in an item 800.00 arrangement. The
system is also utilized to produce items in industrialized countries such as Canada and Great
Britain. See UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE USE OF
ITEMS 807.00 AND 806.30 OF THE TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE. UNITED STATES 142-48 (1970).
3 " Item 800.00 provides the general framework and allows the duty free import of all
goods originally exported from the U.S. when they return without having "advanced in value
or improved in condition." Item 807.00 allows goods that are assembled abroad in whole or
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facilitate the transfer of labor intensive operations to developing
countries. The most popular development from this system is the
Maquiladora Program 3 H in Mexico.
The governments of Mexico and the United States have co-
operated to set up an extensive series of border assembly opera-
tions. 313 Typically, raw materials are exported to Mexico from the
United States duty free, secured by a bond.'" The goods are then.
assembled in Mexico, resulting in lower labor costs, as well as savings
on resources and services. 317 The goods are then exported back to
the United States, and the manufacturer pays duty only on value
added by the low cost, labor.
This system obviously contributes to both dimensions of the
impact on labor policy. It shifts production, causing job losses, and
allows American companies to • utilize exploited labor. The dual
justifications are that it allows American business to remain com-
petitive and it provides jobs to workers in developing countries.
The first reason is the most prevalent — eighty-two percent of
the surveyed American companies operating a Maquiladora indi-
cated that they did so in order to remain competitive. 318 The ar-
gument is that if the American companies did not have access to
the cheap labor to displace high American labor costs, they would
either go out of business or shift their entire operation to a devel-
oping country, both resulting in a greater loss of American jobs. 3 t 9
Thus, the apologists admit that the system costs some American
jobs, but assert that this loss is necessary to allow American business
to remain competitive in the world. This statement assumes that
the only solution to the trade problem is to ignore labor policy
concerns and provide American companies with a way to compete
with cheap labor from developing countries. Other solutions are
possible that would not result in an exploitive race to find the world's
ilt part from components made in the U.S. to be imported to the U.S. with duty charged
only in the value added by the assembly. Item 806.30 is similar but applies to metal products
that are manufactured in the U.S. but sent abroad for further processing. Tiari:Scurnuus,
supra note 311.
3" A Maquiladora is commonly understood to be "an off-shore assembly operation
involved in export•manufacturing processing or secondary assemblage." Note, An Investor's
Introduction to Mexico's Maquiladora Program, 22 Tex. / NT. L.J. 109, 110 (1986).
Many of the assembly operations are in the border towns of Matamoros, Nuevo
Laredo, Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana. Id. at 1 11.
11 " Id. at 113-14.
'" Id. at ill.
3111 Id, at 111-12, n.19.
319
 Id. at 112-13.
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cheapest labor. 32° Further, the system results in a disadvantage to
those companies that have kept their production in the United
States.
The second reason does little to justify the program. Given the
subsistence wages paid to workers in programs such as the Maqui-
ladora in Mexico, the workers gain little but the chance to remain
barely alive."' Item 800.00, unlike the other trade benefits, does
not require any compliance with labor standards. Thus, American
employers are free to realize the purpose of the program — to
utilize cheap labor. The argument that development through ex-
ploitive labor practices is not in the long term interests of the host
country is certainly a valid one. 322
It is difficult to suggest a modification to Item 800.00 of the
tariff regulations that would reduce the impact on American jobs,
because it is so blatantly designed to allow American companies to
utilize cheap labor in developing countries, particularly Mexico. If
the primary goal is to allow American business to remain competi-
tive, then this objective could be satisfied by abolishing the Item
800.00 system and making American goods more competitive by
taking effective action to increase labor standards in the world. 323
To preserve a system that allows American companies to exploit
workers based on a rationale that everyone else does it is not an
easy position to defend from a labor policy perspective, particularly
if there are alternatives to reverse the race to the bottom.
If the system is not revoked, then, at the very least, some
minimum labor conditions, such as those applied in the GSP sys-
tem,324
 should be applied to prevent the blatant exploitation of
workers. For goods to be eligible under the Item 800.00 Tariff, the
country where the value was added by labor should be required to
recognize minimum worker rights. 325
320 See infra text accompanying notes 406-419 for a discussion of other possible solutions.
321 See, e.g., M. FERNANDEZ-KELLY, FOR WE ARE SOLD, I AND MY PEOPLE 36,49-50,122—
27 (1983) (descriptions of lifestyle of female employees in a Maquiladora in Mexico).
322 See supra notes 146-230 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exploitation
of workers in developing countries.
323 See infra notes 326-47 and -accompanying text for a discussion of Congressional
efforts to improve labor standards.
524 For a discussion of the GSP standard, see supra notes 265 and 278-80 and accom-
panying text.
325 Many of the countries may already be covered by the worker rights provisions of GSP
or CBERA.
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V. FURTHER TRADE-BASED REGULATION OF WORKER RIGHTS —
THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS AC'F OF 1988
Congress took a major step in protecting labor policy when it
passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 926
The statute imposes broad trade-based regulation of worker rights
practiced by trading partners. While the Act does nothing to stop
the transfer of production to developing countries and the accom-
panying displacement of American workers, it is a major step in
regulating the more extreme examples of worker exploitation. This
section discusses the scope and enforcement of the Act, raises some
potential problems with enforcement, and makes suggestion's to
insure greater protection for worker rights.
A. Scope and Enforcement
The Act makes it an express "unreasonable" trade practice for
a country to engage in a persistent pattern of conduct that
(I) denies workers the right of association,
(II) denies workers the right to organize and bargain
collectively,
(III) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor,
(IV) fails to provide a minimum age for the employ-
ment of children, or
(V) fails to provide standards for minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health of
workers."'
This standard is but one express definition of "unreasonable" for
purposes of the Act. 328 A finding that a country is engaging in an
unreasonable practice allows the United States Trade
Representative329 to take certain retaliatory actions.'" The under-
lying rationale is that a country utilizing repressive policies to restrict
labor rights artificially restricts the cost of labor, giving that country
an unfair trading advantage. To repress labor rights is much like a
"3 Pub. L. No. 100-418, sec. 1301, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
3" Id. at § 301(d)(B)(iii), 102 Stat. 1107, 1167 (amending section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1986)).
32H
	 at § 301(d)(13), 102 Stat. 1107, 1167.
329 Id. at § 301(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1164,
"' Id. at § 301(c), 102 Stat. 1107, 1165.
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subsidy, because it is a government based policy that creates cost
advantage."'
The Act goes well beyond GSP, CBERA or OPIC because the
requirement to respect worker rights is not simply a precondition
to the receipt of benefits — it is a precondition to trading with the
United States at all. Thus, it applies to all trading partners and
includes a wide range of remedies that goes well beyond the removal
of a benefit. 332
The primary interpretive task is to clarify what constitutes a
violation. By the terms•of the Act, a country's failure to recognize
the specified worker rights"' must "burden[] or restrict[] United
States Commerce."334 As yet, no case law interprets when particular
violations of worker rights "burden or restrict" U.S. commerce. The
requirement seems to be directed at identifying a harmful effect.
Simply to deny worker rights in the abstract is not a violation —
the effect has to harm U.S. trade interests either in the United
States or in other markets.
Interpretations of other practices defined as unreasonable
trade practices that "burden or restrict" commerce under earlier
versions of the Trade Act are helpful in analyzing the potential
scope of enforcement. If, for example, a company in Malaysia sells
computer chips in the United States at well below market rates
because of an advantage gained by a policy or practice of the Ma-
laysian government to restrict worker rights, 335
 this would be a
"burden" on commerce."" Further, if the same chips were sold in
a third country, Great Britain, at the expense of American products,
this too would burden U.S. commerce. 337 Thus, American compa-
3" See, e.g., Worker's Rights and Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs: Hearings on S. 490
and H.R. 3 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1987) (comment by
Howard Samuel, President of the Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO, that "foreign exploi-
tation of workers is in effect the cruelest subsidy of all.").
332 For a discussion or the possible remedies, see infra notes 338-41 and accompanying
lex t.
399
	 a discussion of problems with enforcement of the worker rights provisions
specified in the Act, quoted in the text supra at note 327, see infra notes 343-47 and
accompanying text.
334 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, sec. 1301,
§ 301(b)( I ), 102 Stat. 1107, 1165 (1988).
"5 The statute makes clear that it must be the "act, policy, or practice of a foreign country"
that must deny worker rights, not a foreign company. Id. (emphasis added),
"' See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(2) (1978). Congress, in passing the FLSA, declared that
"labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living neces-
sary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . burdens commerce." Id.
3" See, Hello Hohner, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, and
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Flies can potentially be protected at home and abroad from unfair
competition gained from exploitation of labor. The irony is that
American MNCs will be subject to these restrictions when operating
in another country, and exports from those companies to the United
States may be held to burden or restrict commerce if it leads to
unfair competition with American based producers.
The remedies available are sufficiently broad and flexible to
serve as a potent force in enforcing worker rights internationally.
The remedies most likely to be effective are the power to "suspend,
withdraw or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement
concessions to carry out a trade agreement" with the foreign country
found to be in violation"' and the ability to "impose duties or other
import restrictions on the goods of, and ... fees or restrictions on
the services of" the foreign country. 33" Further, in selecting a pen-
alty, the Trade Representative is authorized to single out a partic-
ular country's goods,"" and is not required to restrict the penalty
to the goods or economic sector from which the unlawful conduct
occurred. 3"t If the Trade Representative is inclined to enforce
worker rights, the tools clearly exist.
B. Potential Problems With Enforcement,
The primary problem with enforcement is that the Trade Rep-
resentative has wide discretion to pursue other agendas besides
worker rights enforcement. 342 The Act provides that alleged worker
Developments, 7 N.W.J. or 1Nrr, L. & Bus. 633, 644 (1086) (discussing the Trade Act of 1974
prior to the recent amendments, the authors assert that if a country unlawfully subsidized
an export in a market in competition with the U.S., this would "burden" U.S. commerce.).
333 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, sec. 1301,
§ 301(c)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 1107, 1165 (1088).
"9 Id. at § 301(c)(1)(B), 102 Stat. 1107, 1166.
'4° Id. at
	
301(c)(3)(A), 102 Stat. 1107, 1166.
54 ' Id. at § 301(c)(3)(B), 102 Stat, 1107, 1166. ln other words, even if Malaysia's semi-
conductor industry is largely responsible for worker rights violations, the U.S. can impose a
duty on that country's palm oil.
342 The discretion is express for worker rights violations. The Act creates two categories
of trade violations — those that require mandatory enforcement and those allowing discre-
tionary enforcement. Worker rights violations arc in the latter category. Id. §§ 301(b)(1) and
301(d)(3)(B)(iii), 102 Stat. 1107, 1165, 1167. In her recent confirmation hearings, the new
U.S. Trade Representative appointed by President Bush, Carla Hill, pledged to enforce
aggressively U.S. rights under trade laws, She explained that the prior problems of enforce-
ment of trade policies generally were clue to diffusion of enforcement power, She stated that
these problems have been cured throUgh the fusion of powers in the Trade Representative
under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. See Farnsworth, Wiry Trade
Remains a Jumble, N.Y. Times, Jan, 29, 1989, at F-4, col. 2.
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rights violations shall not be considered unreasonable if they "are
not inconsistent with the level of economic development of the
foreign country."3" Further, the Trade Representative may decline
enforcement if the country is taking "actions that demonstrate a
significant and overall advancement" in worker rights. 344 This prob-
lem has already been discussed in the context of GSP. 345
A further problem with enforcement is that the Act is unilat-
eral. Trade-based regulation would be enhanced if other countries
participated. Under current law, the President is directed to pursue
"the adoption of international fair labor standards . . in the
GATT."346 Inclusion of a worker rights provision in GATT would
enhance greatly the stature of worker rights in the world.
Rather than being viewed as an issue the United States is uni-
laterally imposing on the world, GATT inclusion would spread the
responsibility and reduce the chances for unfair retaliation. Without
inclusion in GATT, countries that suffer penalties could retaliate
consistently with GATT provisions. 347
VI. REGULATION TO PREVENT DISPLACEMENT OF AMERICAN
WORKERS
A. The Rationale for Regulation of Worker Displacement
Through inclusion of provisions in trade bills to require rec-
ognition of worker rights as a condition of receiving trade benefits,
Congress has made definite progress in protecting the second di-
mension of the impact on labor policy from the shift of production
to developing countries — the exploitation of workers in developing
countries. Virtually no regulation, however, deals with the first di-
mension — the displacement of American workers by companies
seeking to avoid the costs associated with American labor laws. 34 s
343 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, sec. 1301,
§ 301(d)(3)(C)(i)(II), 102 Stat. 1107, 1168 (1988).
3" Id. at 301(d)(3)(C)(i), 102 Stat. 1107.
"3 See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of these provisions
of GSP.
340 19 U.S.C. 213(a)(4) (1980). The GATT is a multilateral agreement that sets the -
ground rules for trade between member states. See generally D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 1-41 (1986).
347
	
e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
part 11, art. Ill, sec. 2, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
3'8 For a discussion of the minimal restrictions that do apply, see id. notes 96-97 and
accompanying text.
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Even if the standards for worker rights in developing countries are
enforced, wages in developing countries can still be substantially
lower than in the United States. As long as this differential exists,
the incentive remains to transfer production.
Congress' neglect to provide effective regulation to prevent the
displacement of American workers raises vital issues of American
policy. Much more is at stake than simply the traditional conflict
between management and organized labor. All workers, white and
blue collar, professional and technical, are potential victims when
companies search for cheaper labor. 349 Even if the workers are able
to find other jobs, this ignores the devastating impact on their lives.
Workers are not simply fungible pieces of equipment that can be
readily interchanged. Studies confirm the devastating psychological
consequences of job loss." 0
Further, the impact on communities is devastating when major
elements of the workforce are left unemployed."' In addition to
impact from job loss, the trade deficit'is directly related to transfer-
ring production for the purpose of exporting back to the United
States."2 Also, issues of technology transfer threaten American
competitiveness3' 3 and environmental protection, as companies also
try to escape the cost of compliance with environmental regula-
tions."'
Given these important interests at stake, the obvious question
is why American policy has not attempted to deal with these prob-
lems. In the absence of a compelling justification, the case for reg-
ulation to protect American workers seems clear.
It is difficult to confront the case for the modern runaway shop
because no affirmative policy in place permits it. The displacement
is occurring as a result of a void in policy, so Congress has never
had to justify a policy. Further, few are willing to go on record as
being in favor of such a policy because it is so clearly opposed to
American interests. Instead, management simply denies that work-
349 See, e.g., B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 53-56. See supra notes 128-
30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of this practice on employment.
"" E.g., S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1987).
351 Sec supra note 17 and accompanying text for a similar point about the impact on
communities.
35/ See, e.g., CAVANAUGli, supra note 130, at 17; BERGSTEN, HORST AND MORAN, supra note
107, at 45.
'Si See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exportation of
American technology to foreign countries.
354 Cf. 22 U.S.C. 2199(g) (1986) (OM requires an environmental impact statement
before any project can be approved).
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ers are losing jobs due to foreign investment, and mount statistical
wars to show that all foreign investment creates jobs. 355
As an initial matter then, it is reasonable to posit that Congress
would act if it were clear that some foreign investment is done for
the purpose of transferring production to developing countries to
obtain cheap labor and export the products back to the United
States, resulting in a loss of American jobs. As was discussed earlier,
it is difficult to demonstrate this because little direct information is
available on this point. 358
 A more refined analysis, however, reveals
that not all foreign investment is consistent with American inter-
ests.357
 Information measuring the impact of different types of
foreign investment is crucial to a more accurate analysis of the
problem.
A necessary first step is to begin gathering data on the company
source of imports, as well as information on how companies that
reduce their American workforce are replacing their production. 358
Direct information on the relationship between trade and employ-
ment would reinforce the connection and hopefully encourage
broader thinking that goes beyond the historic piecemeal approach
to legislation in the trade area. 359
Congress' failure to consider seriously the need to protect
American workers, 38° even though it has gone to great lengths to
attempt to regulate worker rights in developing countries, requires
a closer examination. Besides a collective lack of information, two
explanations are likely. One is that Congress responded to the more
powerful interest group and intentionally set up a system to allow
355 See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the competing
claims as to the effects of foreign investment.
"' See supra note 124 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal government's
failure to gather information in this area.
"7 Sec supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of
foreign investment.
35' The information gathering would he an integral part of a proposed regulation to
prohibit runaway shops. See infra notes 416-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of
such a proposed scheme.
33`> traditional problem has been singularly focused legislation that examines only the
narrow problem and fails to see relationships between various policies affecting trade. See
e.g., BERGSTEN, HORST AND MORAN, supra note 107, at 3-5, 16, 31.
360
 The only direct attempt to regulate in this area was the Burke-Hartke bill, The
Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972, 5.2592, which would have, among other things,
restricted foreign investment by U.S. companies. 117 Coivo. REC. 533,594 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1971). The bill did not, however, differentiate between types of foreign investment. Thus,
even foreign investment that might increase domestic employment was restricted. The bill
was never enacted.
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MNCs to transfer production, regardless of the impact on American
workers. 36 ' This is certainly the most troubling explanation, but
unfortunately does not lend itself to analysis. 362 Perhaps a reason-
able goal is to focus more attention on the problem by gathering
information and assessing any failure to act at that point.
The second and more likely explanation is that a belief system
is operating that supports the assumption that no serious conflict
of interest exists between MNCs' behavior and broader American
interests, specifically those interests protected by labor policy. The
apparent philosophy underlying a regulatory scheme that focuses
only on the labor practices of foreign governments in an attempt
to remedy the erosion of U.S. jobs is that these foreign countries
are responsible for the exploitation of their citizens in an attempt
to compete unfairly with the United States; the competitors are
"us," meaning American companies, and "them," meaning the for-
eign competition. This philosophy was perhaps accurate prior to
the internationalization of the economy, 363 but radical changes in
the international economy require a re-examination of this funda-
mental belie 1. 564
The reluctance to regulate the mobility of capital generally
exacerbates the problem. Free capital mobility is a firmly held tenet
of American capitalism.m 5 This belief, however, is based on the
assumption that American companies will act consistently with
American interests when relocating capital.
Although it is comfortable to believe that Americans share the
common problem of foreign competition, and the government pur-
s in in a debate over the wisdom of renewing (MC, Senator Metzenbaum asserted that
those in favor of the legislation had responded to pressure from lobbyists. See supra note
257. The Senator explained:
According to AFL-C10 estimates, OPIC-supported business ventures over
the past four years have resulted in a kiss of more than 500,000 American jobs.
I do not believe it is wrong for the United States to promote economic and
social development in less developed countries. That is humane policy. Rut I
do object to a policy which cares not one iota about the true needs of foreign
nations but merely paves the way for some U.S. companies to set up production
overseas . . . ODIC is promoting projects and investments in some of the
wealthier countries land] is aiding . • our stillest trade competition,
131 CONG. Ric. 517,478-02 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1985).
"7 See generally, M. GREEN, WHO RUNS CONGRESS (1984).
" See, e.g., BEHGsTEN,RsT & MoitAN, supra note 107, at 17.
, 364 See id. at 31. See also 117 CoNe. Rite. F133,746 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1971) (remarks by
Rep. Burke that current trade regulations "were designed for another period of American
history," before the internationalization of the economy).
sf.' See generally J. MI.ESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 160-70
(1983).
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sues policies as if that were the case, the reality is that MNCs are
not acting consistently with broader American interests, which
should prompt reconsideration of the reasons for continuing to
assist those companies. Current trade policy provides a graphic
example. In its most positive light, assuming that Congress did not
intend to encourage American MNCs to transfer production to
developing countries, Congress set up a trade system through GSP,
CBERA and OPIC that was designed to assist developing countries
in developing an industrial base primarily to create markets for U.S.
exports.366 This, again, is a manifestation of a traditional "trickle
down" theory; American workers would eventually benefit from the
expansion of American business. Because of the well engrained
belief that American business would act consistently with American
interests, it was unnecessary to go to great lengths to remove the
possibility that American companies would utilize the opportunity
to benefit themselves at the expense of American interests.
President Reagan's veto of the first Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 provided an illustration of this belief in
operation. 367 His veto message contained a reiteration of his partic-
ular trickle down philosophy — "lower tax rates, reduced regula-
tion" and local contro1.368 He stated that the criteria he used in
deciding to veto the act was whether the legislation "will create jobs
and help sustain our economic growth." 369
Based on this reasoning, he vetoed the bill largely because of
the mandatory plant closing notice to workers. 3 " Using the specific
example of the Caterpillar Company, he reasoned that jobs would
be lost with a mandatory closing law because companies "need to
be flexible to meet foreign competition . . . Without the ability to
be agile and responsive, [the Caterpillar Company] might have
closed their doors permanently." 37 '
President Reagan's veto message expresses the traditional trust
that MNCs will look out for the interests of their workers if simply
366 See supra note 251 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criteria that a
business must meet to be eligible for assistance.
367 The bill was ultimately passed in a slightly modified form. See supra note 326 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the passage of this bill.
I" 101 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-I (May 25, 1988).
' 69 Id.
879 Id. at D-3. This provision was ultimately passed separately. See supra notes 103-04
and accompanying text for a discussion of a bill requiring worker notification.
"' Id. at D-4. Interestingly, this precise argument was used in the 1920s to oppose
minimum wages, child labor laws and a workers compensation system. B. BLUESTONE & B.
HARRISON, supra note 13. at 240-41.
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left alone. It illustrates the assumption that with free reign, they
will pursue broader American interests. Unfortunately, more basic
principles of economics prevailed to complicate the President's anal-
ysis. Caterpillar, which as an aside is an OPIC beneficiary, 372 has
substantial manufacturing facilities in developing countries, such as
Korea, and imports all of certain tractors sold in the United States
from Japan. 373 MNCs, like Caterpillar, have used the recent inter-
nationalization of the economy as an opportunity to increase profits
by obtaining cheap labor in developing countries. President Rea-
gan's veto made it easier for them to continue the practice.
In spite of the shortage of complete information on the extent
to which MNCs have transferred production to .developing coun-
tries, there are numerous examples of large MNCs that have been
the beneficiaries of trickle down policies for decades and are now
replacing domestic production with production in developing coun-
tries and exporting back to the United States. For example, USX
Corp. imports steel ingot from Korea; 374 General Motors and Ford
import cars from Korea; 375 Chrysler imports cars from Mexico; 376
General Electric imports various small appliances from Asia; 377 and
IBM imports data processing equipment from Asia. 378 Further, the
Japanese are held up as a primary threat to our economy that
requires the government to give a free reign to business to stand
toe-to-toe with the enemy. The picture is complicated, however, by
the fact that, for example, Ford owns 25% of Mazda, GM owns
34.4% of lsuzu Motors, and Chrysler owns 15% of Mitsubishi, 379
Further, General Electric owns 40% of Toshiba Electronics Systems
Co. 38°
These specific examples illustrate that it is no longer a safe
assumption that American MNCs will act consistently with American
interests. A rather surprising admission by an executive of the Ford
Motor Company expresses a more accurate view of modern reality:
It is our goal to be in every single country there is.
Iron curtain countries, Russia, China. We at Ford Motor
company look at a world map without any boundaries.
"3 See supra note 304 for a list of more OPEC clients.
3" Finn & Healy, supra note 134, at 83.
374 Id.
375 Id.
"6 Id.
3" ld.
37" Id.
3" G. HAAS, PLANT-CLOSURES - MYTHS, REALITIES AND RESPONSES 18-19 (1985).
5'" B. BLUESTONE Se B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 143.
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We don't consider ourselves basically an American
company. We are ,a multi-national company. And when
we approach a government that does not like the United
States, we always say, "who do you like? Britain? Germany?
We carry a lot of flags. We export from every country. "381
There are other similar examples of the philosophy of modern
MNGs.382 These expressions of the true goals of MNCs are simply
an acknowledgement of the realities of capitalism. 383 The same
principles were at work when American companies resisted any
efforts to improve working conditions in this country. 384 While these
developments make perfect sense to an economist, they provide a
graphic illustration as to why the old assumptions are harming
broader American interests. MNCs will not act consistently with
American interests when it is not profitable, and the mounting
evidence requires recognition of this fact. 385
Before concluding that Congress has simply failed to act be-
cause of outdated assumptions regarding the conflict between the
interests of MNCs and broader American interests, it is necessary
to consider whether there are compelling reasons for failing to act
even though it is clear that some foreign investment by American
MNCs is displacing American labor. Perhaps the best case for allow-
ing American companies to displace costly American workers is that
the companies need to remain competitive in the world market.
The argument is that if American firms are prevented from freely
closing plants to achieve economic efficiency, then their products
will not be price competitive, and American interests will ultimately
be damaged. 386
5" Trade Adjustment Assistance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1972) (statement by Robert
Stevenson, Ford Executive Vice President for International Operations).
382
 The Chairman of what was formerly U.S. Steel, David M. Roderick, was quoted as
saying "U.S. Steel is not in the business of making steel. It is in the business of making
money." G. HAAS, supra note 379, at 24.
3" E.g., Boddy & Crotty, Class Conflict and Macro-Policy: The Political Business Cycle, 1975
Rev. OF RAD. POL. ECON. 7 (Spring 1975).
See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the efforts of
American companies to resist the labor movement.
3"s
	 general theme is fully explored in R. BARNNET & R. MOLLER, supra note 9.
8"6 One expression of this argument conies in the defense of the Maquiladora program.
See, e.g., Comment, The Approaching Confrontation Over Item 807.00 of the Tariff Schedule, 4 L.
& Pus.. IN INT. Bus. 628, 633 (1972). See also, S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1987)
(remarks by Senator Thurmond in opposition to the Worker Notification Act that regulation
of plant closings causes a "drain of resources into inefficient operations").
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There are four primary responses to this position. First, effec-
tive enforcement of trade-based restrictions will do much to remove
any unfair advantage gained by using cheap labor."' This is partic-
ularly true if it becomes in the interest of American MNCs to use
their influence to see that the provisions are enforced. Currently,
for MNCs operating in developing countries and exporting to the
United States, it is against their interest to lobby for more stringent
enforcement of Labor rights in developing countries."' While effec-
tive enforcement or the trade regulations will not equalize wages, it
will do much to close the artificially wide gap caused by repression
of worker rights in many developing countries.
Second, the nature of this alleged "foreign competition" must
be analyzed. In some cases it is the American based MNCs that are
importing products to compete with domestically produced
goods) 89 This results in a disadvantage only to the American com-
panies that have remained loyal to American workers and continue
to manufacture domestically.
Third, the argument presumes that the goal of American
MNCs is to operate with as large an American workforce as possible,
and only reluctantly transfer operations in the interests of somehow
supporting the inefficient American operations through a subsidy
gained by utilizing cheap labor. This simply conflicts with the evi-
dence. The companies leave to avoid American labor costs, not to
subsidize them. There is little evidence of an overriding loyalty. 39 ( 1
To assert that it is necessary to allow companies to displace Amer-
ican labor to preserve other American labor ignores the nature of
3" Rep. Donald Pease, one of the leaders in the effort to improve worker rights in the
world, has stated, "if workers are given the basic freedom that they ought to have, of
organizing and bargaining collectively, for example, there will be a trend toward improving
the lives of those workers . . . ." CAVANAUGH, Apra note 130, at 1, The passage of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, with its broad application of worker rights
to all trading partners, will do much to Railer the evolution of worker rights in developing
countries. See supra notes 326-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Act.
"" Currently, American MNCs have an incentive to lobby against any restrictions on
worker rights. See, e.g., Trade Adjustment Assistance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92 Cong., 2nd Sess. 38 (1972) (remarks
by Andrew J. lliemillen Director of Legislation. AFL-CIO, that Ford-Philco, which closed an
electronics facility in Sandusky, Ohio and transferred production to Taiwan, is a member of
the Committee for a National Track Policy and the Emergency Committee for American
Trade).
3" See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of an American
company with manufacturing facilities in developing countries,
"° See supra notes 374-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of American com-
panies acting inconsistently with American interests,
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the problem and the extensive evidence of wholesale dislocation of
American workers. 39 ' It is true that the companies are making their
operations more cost efficient by relocating to developing coun-
tries, 392 but this is simply an acknowledgement of the problem. If
the end result is that the companies become more profitable at the
expense of American workers, the crucial question is whether this
is necessary and consistent with American interests. 393 It makes little
sense to have a policy geared exclusively towards allowing a small,
elite group of large MNCs to maximize their profits if there is no
corresponding benefit to broader American interests.
Finally, regardless of the extent that other countries permit the
use of .exploited labor, that in itself does not justify the practice.
American policy should be geared to something besides the lowest
common denominator.
A further argument that may be advanced to justify the dis-
placement of expensive American workers should be addressed.
The argument is that this is simply a manifestation of the free
market at work. Free market advocates would contend that the
market is best served when the most cost efficient means of pro-
duction are utilized. 394
The response to this argument is that this debate was resolved
when labor legislation was enacted to protect workers from the
exploitation of the free market. American labor policy is based on
the premise that there are more important values than cost effi-
ciency, such as preventing the exploitation of workers. 395 To revive
a policy that puts cost efficiency above the interests of the millions
effected by the erosion of labor policy is to step back nearly a
century in humanitarian social policy. 396 If the long term future of
the international economy is to have nations specialize in producing
items at which they are most efficient, this does not justify allowing
" I See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dislocation of
American workers.
" 2 General Motors reported record profits for 1988 of 4.86 billion dollars. The increase,
however, was largely due to its foreign operations. L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
"'See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the idea that growing
business benefits America.
"I See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dangers of unre-
strained business. See also B. liLuEsToNE B. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 8-9 (discussing
the Lester Thurow argument that our economy would be healthier if it could move out of
inefficient, unproductive activities more quickly).
9y5 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the range of issues
that arise between workers and management.
3146 See supra note 53.
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a short term exploitation of workers in developing countries. That
is not an issue of efficiency, but instead illustrates the need to
preserve labor policy to prevent a situation where countries that
allow the exploitation of their workers will be deemed efficient and
gain a competitive advantage.
Further, the underlying premise of the free market theory is
that society benefits from more efficient production through lower
prices.397 There is, however, little evidence that cost savings realized
through cheap third world labor are being passed on to the con-
sumer. 398
Finally, the status quo is not a true free market. To a large
extent, American trade policies are subsidizing MNCs as they trans-
fer production to developing countries. 899 This provides an artificial
incentive that interferes with market decisions.
Assuming that the second explanation for the failure of Con-
gress to act — that policymakers are simply operating from an
outdated assumption that MNCs continue to act to serve broader
American interests — requires a great deal of faith that elected
representatives are attempting to protect American interests. The
temptation is to accept the first rationale — that policymakers have
been influenced by MNC lobbyists representing their clients — is
great, particularly in light of the overall problems with the lobbying
system. 10°
The potential conflict between the MNCs' interests and inter-
ests served by labor policy is great. The reality of the interna-
tional economy must be incorporated with current policy to
alter the outdated perception that American interests are served
as long as business prospers. To continue to support large
MNCs through incentives to expand abroad, 4 °' government subsi-
dized research,402 lucrative government contracts,493 and tax
387 See, e.g., R. BAJINNET Sc R. MULLER, supra note 9, at 322; Goldfinger, An American
Trade Union View of Trade and Investment, in AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION 39 (D. Kujawa ed. 1973).
"8 See id.
3" See supra notes 231-325 and accompanying text for a discussion of American com-
panies moving their production to foreign countries.
""' See generally, M. GREEN, WHO Rum CONGRESS (1984).
"' The primary incentives are provided by GSI', CBERA and OPIC, discussed supra
notes 231-325 and accompanying text.
412 The subsidized development of technology that is then exported was identified as
one of the primary factors leading to the introduction of the Foreign Trade and Investment
Act of 1972. 117 CONG. REc. H33,746 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1971) (remarks by Rep. Burke).
419
 See, e.g., 135 CONC. REG. S601-01 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (discussing The Save
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breaks,"4
 without any requirement that those companies in fact do
act to further American interests, and in the face of clear evidence
that some of the companies are enriching themselves at the expense
of American interests, is an extreme form of an unjust enrichment
program with serious long term consequences. At the very least,
the assumption should be refined to protect the clear interests
served by labor policy from damage caused by a void in policy
stemming from an outdated belief system. If the fundamental ra-
tionale for assisting business is to increase employment and gener-
ally spread prosperity,405
 then that goal should become the focus of
a new policy designed to confront the reality of the international
economy.
B. A Proposal for Regulation of Worker Displacement
The most important factor in making any proposal to regulate
the displacement of American workers is to focus precisely on the
offending practice — transfers of production to developing coun-
tries for the purpose of using cheap labor and exporting the prod-
ucts back to the United States. A regulation that is too broad and
interferes with other types of foreign investment that are consistent
with American interests will fuel legitimate objections. Expansions
to foreign markets to increase U.S. exports, or capture a local
market, should not be discouraged. Because most companies cite
these reasons for foreign investment, and deny that they are fleeing
American labor, 406 little room for principled objection should re-
main if a regulation could restrict only the latter practice.
To be effective, the regulation must reach more than the blatant
runaway shop, which is not the normal practice, 407 and consider
other ways that an American M NC might transfer production to a
developing country. The company could, to give a few examples,
American jobs Act). The Act, introduced by Senator Metzenbaum, would ban any company
that relocates to a foreign country from receiving any federal loans or grants, and require
any federal agency awarding a contract to give preference to companies that have not
relocated a portion of their business to other countries. Id.
404 A long standing cornerstone of the trickle down philosophy has been to provide tax
breaks to business. See text accompanying note 39, supra, for a discussion of the trickle down
philosophy.
4°5 See supra notes 358-64 and accompanying text for an example of this philosophy.
406 See supra note 107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons that
American companies give for foreign investment.
4° 7 The blatant runaway shop may account for as little as 2% of job loss. It is the other,
more subtle forms of disinvestment that are endangering American industry. See, e.g., B.
BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, Supra note 13, at 6-10.
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build an expansion facility in a developing country and eventually
phase out American production; it could simply stop producing a
product and purchase it from a supplier based in a developing
country; or, it could produce a competing product as a joint venture
with a company in a developing country and stop producing its
American product because it cannot compete on the basis of cost.
All of these have the same impact as a blatant runaway shop. The
only difference is timing and appearance.
The goal then is to impose a policy to prevent displacements
that result in exports to the United States. The first step is to remove
any incentives in place to relocate. This has already been discussed
in connection with the trade policies that do provide incentives for
American companies to transfer production to developing coun-
tries." Along this same line, any direct government subsidies, such
as grants and guaranteed loans, as well as the opportunity to par-
ticipate in government contracts, should be limited to companies
that are not undermining American interests by transferring pro-
duction to obtain cheaper labor. These goals could be accomplished
by the Save American Jobs Acem° recently introduced by Senator
Metzenbaum. As the Senator explained in introducing the legisla-
tion, "companies must understand that when they shut the door on
American workers, Uncle Sam is going to close his wallet to
then-1.'11 °
Once the incentives are removed, the need to prohibit the clear
displacement of American workers by transferring production to
other countries remains. This could be accomplished by a simple
change in present law. Under the Worker Adjustment and Retrain-
ing Notification Act,`"' an employer must give 60 days notice to
employees before closing or reducing the workforce. 412 As part of
the notice, the employer could be required to indicate what product
lines are effected and how the discontinued production would be
replaced. If the company planned to import the product, even from
preexisting sources, 413 the closing would be permitted only with a
corresponding ban on imports of the effected product. The em-
406 See supra notes 259-63, 303-04, and 323-25 and accompanying text for a discussion
of some of these trade policies.
4" See supra note 402 for a discussion of this Act.
lin 135 CoNc. REC. S601-01 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989).
4 " Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988).
Id. at	 3.
413 This would prevent the delayed reaction plant closing, where domestic production is
phased out after a foreign facility is operating.
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ployer would still retain the right of entrepreneurial control to
decide to close his plant completely, 414
 but the company could not
close for the purpose of displacing American workers, and still have
access to the American market.
Enforcement could be quite direct. A company that closes a
plant or reduces its workforce would be barred from receiving
imports of the affected product. 415
 This ban could be permanent
or for a sufficient term of years to serve as a deterrent. Thus, access
to the lucrative American market, made so by high wages, would
be denied to companies seeking to have the best of both worlds.
As part of the enforcement scheme, as discussed earlier, infor-
mation would be gathered to monitor the extent to which American
companies are importing products for sale that displace former
domestic production. 4 ' 6 This would allow a true assessment of
whether further steps are needed to repair the harm that has al-
ready occurred. Further, other types of foreign investment that do
not directly impact labor policy, but may result in the export of
jobs,417 could be monitored to determine if further action is neces-
sary.
While it is considered heretical today to advocate . any restric-
tions on free market development,418 the threat to labor policy by
the internationalization of the economy cannot be ignored. In sim-
pler times it was necessary to protect certain-labor rights by prohib-
iting plant closings designed to escape unionization. 4 t" Similar action
is needed to stop the modern international version of the runaway
shop. Today, labor policy is much more seriously threatened as jobs,
both union and non-union, are lost as employers flee to escape the
414 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of some restrictions
on employer discretion.
This is similar in spirit to a provision in the Burke-Hartke bill, introduced in 1971
but never passed, that would have limited imports produced abroad with U.S. components
on the theory that domestic demand should not be met by U.S. companies producing abroad.
See BERGSTEN, HORST & MORAN, supra note 107, at 111-12.
416
 See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for
information on the extent of displacement of domestic production.
4 " See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of foreign investment.
"I" See, e.g., Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomnis on Labor and Employment and Productivity Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1987) (in opposing the Worker Notification Act, Sen.
Gordon Humphrey remarked "[t]his proposal . . . is a Marxist Economist's dream. Under
the guise of simple notice and consultation requirements, this proposal is the most radical
restructuring of economic decision making proposed in recent years").
419 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of restrictions on
employers' power to close plants.
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costs of labor regulation. Other important interests are at stake as
the national trade deficit worsens, and as the transfer of new tech-
nologies and the failure to modernize American factories threaten
America's competitiveness. The proposed regulation would prevent
;his from occurring by focusing on the conduct that threatens labor
policy, but still recognizing the value of most international growth.
Legitimate foreign expansion that furthers American interests
would continue to be fostered. The proposal recognizes, however,
that not all foreign investment furthers American interests, and
seeks to align policy with the presumed, goal of furthering interests
broader than the international growth of MNCs. Such an important
policy question can no longer be ignored, and, in effect, resolved
by default.
VII. CONCLUSION
The internationalization of the economy has created an exciting
dynamic as companies of many nations compete to participate in
the explosion of growth occurring in the developing countries. This
period is reminiscent of the industrial expansion of the United
States earlier in this century.
Unfortunately, there are other parallels as well. Companies
expanding into developing countries set the windfall of turning
back the clock to an earlier period of industrialization in the United
States. These companies can employ workers under much the same
conditions as were present in this country nearly a century ago.
This development speaks poorly of the priorities of the indus-
trialized world. The moral awakening that led to modern labor
legislation has been enthusiastically cast aside for the opportunity
to operate free of the costly restrictions designed to give workers a
chance to earn a decent wage and work under reasonable condi-
tions.
When American companies participate in the exploitation of
workers in developing countries, they are not only engaging in
conduct that American law has long branded illegal, but are casting
aside American workers simply because they are protected by hu-
mane legislation. A basic fairness issue is at stake when companies
that were developed through American resources and workers,
were beneficiaries of decades of trickle down policies, made pros-
perous by American consumers and government contracts, and
protected in the world by American military and diplomatic efforts,
seek to deny the primary thing they were expected to give in return
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— the opportunity for Americans to work for a livable wage. This
has violated the basic compact underlying labor policy and the other
policies designed to help business prosper. The harm is magnified
as other American interests, such as the expanding trade deficit,
the transfer of technology, and the decline of American competi :
tiveness stemming from the refusal to modernize American facilities
are all directly effected.
Policymakers responsible for representing American interests
can no longer ignore that the internationalization of the economy
has changed the underlying relationship between the interests of
business and the interests of Americans. The values underlying
labor policy will simply be viewed as technical nuisances that can be
easily circumvented unless the policy is modernized to reflect cur-
rent realities.
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